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Adaptive Ecosystem Management and
Regulatory Penalty Defaults:
Toward a Bounded Pragmatism
t

Bradley C. Karkkainen

INTRODUCTION
Conservation ecologists and natural resource managers
assert that integrated management of complex ecosystems
requires an iterative and adaptive management approach.1
Under this view, policy measures are seen as inescapably
provisional and experimental, subject to subsequent
modification in response to new learning and changing
conditions. 2 In characteristically Deweyan fashion, this "rolling
rule" strategy pragmatically and continuously adjusts both
ends and means in light of experience and learning. Yet
t Associate Professor, Columbia Law School; Visiting Professor, 200203, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley. The author
thanks Jim Chen, Mike Dorf, Archon Fung, Jamie Grodsky, Dara O'Rourke,
Eric Orts, Chuck Sabel, Bill Simon, and workshop participants at UCBerkeley, UC-Davis, Cornell, and Minnesota for helpful comments on previous
drafts.
1. See, e.g., KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING
SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 7-10 (1993) (arguing for the

need for adaptive management as a strategy to learn how to achieve an
environmentally sustainable
economy); CARL WALTERS,
ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES 2-3 (Wayne M. Getz ed., 1986)

(arguing that uncertainty and complexity of ecological systems call for an
"adaptive learning process, where management activities themselves are
viewed as the primary tools for experimentation"); Kristen Blann & Stephen S.
Light, The Key Ingredients of an Adaptive Probe 1-3 (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.iatp.org/AEAMprobe.doc (last visited
Mar. 9, 2003); Kai N. Lee, Appraising Adaptive Management, CONSERVATION
ECOLOGY 3 (Sept. 8,
1999), at http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss2/
art3/index.html; Carl Walters, Challenges in Adaptive Management of
Riparianand Coastal Ecosystems, CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 1 (Nov. 11, 1997),
at www.consecol.org/voll/iss2/artl/index.html.
2. See Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, in
BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM 1, 6-9 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers

eds., 2000) (describing the pragmatic "rolling rule" regulatory regime).
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lawyers, legal academics, and environmental NGOs worry that
the absence of clear, legally enforceable, fixed procedural rules
and substantive standards will translate into a kind of openended discretion likely to yield to unprincipled compromise,
self-dealing, and a lack of accountability in basic governance
processes. 3 In short, the concern is that adaptive management
4
stands in tension with the fundamental rule of law precepts.
This Article argues that one important category of rule, the
"regulatory penalty default," is compatible with an adaptive
approach to decision making, and indeed may be a necessary
precondition. A regulatory penalty default is a harsh or quasipunitive regulatory requirement that applies as the default
rule if parties fail to reach a satisfactory alternative
arrangement. Like their counterparts in contract theory,
regulatory penalty defaults have an information-forcing
character: By creating incentives for regulated entities to
contract around the default rule, they also create corollary
incentives for these parties to produce and disclose such
information as may be necessary to construct and win
regulatory approval for alternative proposals.
Regulatory
penalty defaults also can introduce accountability into such
agreements if they are structured to establish threshold
standards of environmental performance. The "no-take"
provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA),5 coupled with
3. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered
Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of "New Age" Environmental
Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 52 (2001) (expressing concern that without
additional accountability measures, "adaptive management may become just
another smokescreen to cover politically adaptive evasion of agency
responsibilities"); id. at 61-62 (arguing that policy flexibility is dangerous
because resource management agencies are both "institutionally vulnerable to

focused political pressures" that are more likely to come from regulated
entities than regulatory beneficiaries, and also prone to "overestimate the
effectiveness of their flexible protective strategies"); see also Jody Freeman,
The ContractingState, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 157 (2000) (noting concerns

that "contractual regulatory instruments" are "a recipe for either corporatism
or capture"); Jacqueline Savitz, CompensatingCitizens, in BEYOND BACKYARD
ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 2, at 65, 67-68 (arguing that a shift toward
participatory decision making leaves ordinary citizens at a disadvantage
relative to the money, skill, and technical expertise of regulated parties, thus
serving as a "smokescreen" for deregulation).
4. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance:
Scale, Complexity and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 235 (2002) (citing
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L REV. 1175,

1185-87 (1989)).
5. Endangered Species Act (ESA) § 9(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000)
(making it unlawful to "take" any listed species of fish or wildlife); ESA
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the Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) provision, 6 exhibits
important elements of this regulatory structure.
Part I of this Article discusses the concept of adaptive
management and the leading rationales for its use in natural
resource management. Part L.A identifies a number of distinct
variants on the concept of adaptive management, in theory and
in practice. Part I.B situates the adaptive management concept
in the pragmatist philosophical tradition of John Dewey and
his "experimental method of inquiry." Part I.C discusses
leading criticisms of an adaptive management approach:
specifically, that the degree of discretion required for its
operation stands at odds with fundamental notions of legal
accountability, and may exacerbate familiar problems of
regulatory capture. Part II introduces the concept of the
regulatory penalty default as an antidote to these concerns.
Part III examines the ESA's HCP provision as an illustrative
(albeit imperfect) example of the regulatory penalty default
architecture, and Part IV draws some general conclusions from
that analysis. Part V introduces a note of caution about agency
rent-seeking and bargaining failures that might limit the
usefulness of regulatory penalty defaults in some contexts, and
concludes with a recommendation that the regulatory penalty
default architecture be designed to incorporate, in an adaptive
and experimentalist manner, rolling improvements in both
default rules and performance thresholds.
I. ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AND ITS CRITICS
Adaptive management has become something of a mantra
among conservation ecologists and natural resource managers
seeking to establish "place-based" integrated management of
ecosystems. 7 The argument for adaptive management proceeds
§ 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (defining "take" to include "harass, harm, pursue,

hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in
any such conduct"); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2001)

(defining "harm" to include

"significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or
injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding, or sheltering").

6. ESA § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. 1539(a) (authorizing issuance of "incidental
take permits" if accompanied by an approved Habitat Conservation Plan).
7. Fred Bosselman, A Role for State Planning:IntergenerationalEquity
and Adaptive Management, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 311, 323-25 (2001)

(describing increasing prominence of adaptive management in ecological
science); A. Dan Tarlock, Putting Rivers Back in the Landscape: The Revival of
Watershed Management in the United States, 6 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L.
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from the recognition that conventional environmental
regulation and natural resource management operate
piecemeal, attempting to fraction ecological complexes into
smaller, putatively manageable components, and parceling out
management responsibilities among mission specific agencies
and programs. 8
Consider the typical estuarine ecosystem. Harvesting of
commercially exploited fish and shellfish is the responsibility of
the state fisheries agency, while recreational fisheries fall
under the jurisdiction of a state fish and game department. If
endangered species are affected, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service (FWS) or National Marine Fisheries Service may also
play a role. Water pollution is both the responsibility of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the corresponding
state water pollution control agency. Air pollution, which may
affect water quality through atmospheric deposition, falls
under both the EPA and a state air pollution control agency.
Land use decisions affecting shorelines and tributaries are
largely the responsibility of
local units of government,
although decisions within a state designated "coastal zone" may
also require review by a state coastal zone commission.
Developments in coastal or riparian wetlands, on the other
hand, require permits from the Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps). Agricultural practices that may affect soil and
chemical runoff in upstream tributaries fall under the purview
of either (or both) the federal or state departments of
agriculture.
Coastal, riparian, and upland forests, which
influence both water quality and seasonal flow patterns, may
be the responsibility of state or local park departments, state or
federal forest agencies, the National Park Service, or private
landowners. 9
& POL'Y 167, 189-92 (2000) (noting shift in natural resources management
toward bioregional ecosystem-scale approaches relying on adaptive
management strategies).
8. Richard B. Stewart, A New Generationof EnvironmentalRegulation?,
29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 29-30 (2001) (discussing shortcomings of current
fragmentary and piecemeal approaches to environmental regulation).
9. See Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management,
25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 379, 387-91 (2000) (describing
horizontal and vertical fragmentation of management responsibilities and
interagency competition as barriers to effective management at watershed
scales); William Goldfarb, Watershed Management: Slogan or Solution?, 21
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 483, 485-85 (1994) (stating that responsibility for
managing water resources is fragmented among numerous federal, state, and
local agencies); Ann Powers & Eric S. Andreas, Long Island Sound: A
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Because this fragmented, piecemeal approach tends to
ignore the synergistic effects and complex interdependencies
among the various components and stressors that make up the
ecosystem, management interventions often prove ineffective or
even counterproductive. For example, oyster populations may
be profoundly affected by water quality and the availability of
suitable habitat; yet these variables typically fall outside the
jurisdiction of the state fisheries agency, which instead
attempts to manage oyster abundance solely by regulating the
size of the harvest. By the same token, even though filterfeeding oysters play a critical role in regulating estuarine water
quality, state and federal water pollution control agencies
attempt to manage water quality solely by regulating pollution
inputs.
In the Chesapeake Bay, for example, oyster
populations have fallen to about one percent of historic levels;
where it once took three days for oysters to filter all of the Bay's
water, it now takes a full year. 10 Finally, because oyster reefs
provide valuable habitat for other plant and animal species,
oysters are critical to the overall health of the Bay's
ecosystem." What is required is integrated management at an
ecosystem scale, which in turn requires a high degree of
interagency, intergovermental, and public-private coordination.
Because ecosystems are complex and dynamic entities,
however, they are difficult to manage. Contrary to earlier
ecological thinking, they do not tend toward steady-state
equilibrium conditions, but instead change over time and
exhibit nonlinear effects. 12 Given their dynamic and complex
makeup, they are subject to a high degree of stochasticity,
making it impossible to predict, much less manage, their
precise trajectory. 13 Further complicating the management
Bibliography of Legal and Related Materials, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 447,
449-51 (1996) (noting interrelatedness of problems and fragmentation of
responsibility in estuarine management).
10. CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, STATE OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY:
REPORT

TO

THE

CITIZENS

OF

THE

BAY

REGION

13,

A
http://www.

chesapeakebay.net/pubs/sob/index.cfm (July 2002).
11. See id.
12. See DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 10 (1990); C.S. Holling et al., Science,
Sustainability, and Resource Management, in LINKING SOCIAL AND
ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS
FOR BUILDING RESILIENCE 342, 352-54 (Fikret Berkes & Carl Folke eds.,
1998).
13. REED F. NOSS ET AL., THE SCIENCE OF CONSERVATION PLANNING:
HABITAT CONSERVATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 64 (1997)
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task, we often possess only rudimentary and incomplete
scientific understanding of ecological components and
processes.14
The question, then, is how to manage. The favored
solution among conservation ecologists is some form of adaptive
management, a "learning-by-doing" approach that views
policies and management interventions as explicitly
experimental and provisional, and looks to revise both our
understanding of ecosystems and subsequent policies as we
learn from an iterative series of policy experiments.
A. VARIETIES OF ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
While there is widespread agreement among ecologists and
resource managers on the importance of adaptive management,
considerably less agreement exists about the meaning of that
term.
1. Scientific Hypothesis-Testing
The term "adaptive management" is generally attributed to
ecologist C.S. "Buzz" Holling, who actually used the lengthier
locution
"adaptive
environmental
assessment
and
management" as the title and subject of his seminal 1978
book.' 5 Holling developed the concept not in the context of
adaptive management, but by way of criticizing standard
techniques of environmental impact assessment. 16 As an
ecological expert called upon to participate in several major
environmental impact studies, Holling objected to an approach
that front-loaded inquiry concerning the ecological impacts of a
proposed action into a single, comprehensive, expert-driven,
pre-decision study. Holling argued that this purely predictive
approach was often predicated upon highly uncertain scientific
models. Given this uncertainty, a more scientifically defensible
(asserting that "[sicientists recognize that we will never be able to predict with
great accuracy the outcome of conservation decisions" due in part to the
"inherent stochasticity or chaos of nature"); Holling et al., supra note 12, at
352-53 (stating that "[the] inherent unpredictability of ecosystems plays havoc
with conventional resource management science").
14. See NOSS ET AL., supra note 13, at 64; Holling et al., supra note 12, at
346-47.
15. C.S. HOLLING ET. AL., ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT 1-2 (C.S. Holling ed., 1978).

16. See id. at 47-48 (describing adaptive environmental assessment and
management as an alternative to conventional forms of environmental impact
assessment).
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approach would be to assemble collaborative, interdisciplinary
assessment teams who would not only make initial predictions,
but identify areas of uncertainty, develop testable hypotheses,
and use the implementation phase of the proposed action to
verify and field-test these hypotheses.' 7 This approach, he
argued, would treat environmental impact assessment itself as
an ongoing adaptive process to improve scientific
understanding over time, and thereby enhance science's
predictive capacity.' 8
Carl Walters, a Canadian fisheries biologist, further
developed the adaptive management concept in the context of
fisheries and wildlife management, proceeding from "the
central tenet that management involves a continual learning
process that cannot conveniently be separated into functions
like 'research' and 'ongoing regulatory activities,' and probably
never converges to a state of blissful equilibrium involving full
knowledge and optimum productivity."' 9 Walters's conception
of adaptive management emphasizes the importance of crossdisciplinary integration of existing scientific knowledge into
20
conceptual models of complex dynamic ecosystem processes.
Analysis of these models then leads to the identification of
areas of uncertainty, generation of specific testable hypotheses,
and the design of experimental policies to prove or disprove the
hypotheses thus generated. 2 1 The results of this quasiscientific process lead in turn to revision of the ecological
models upon which later management decisions, including
subsequent rounds of policy experimentation, would be
predicated.2 2 Walters's version of ecosystem management arose
in the context of "place-based" natural resource management,
albeit originally with the relatively narrow objective of
improving management of target fish or wildlife species. By
building a structured process of scientific experimentation into
management decisions, Walters's approach, like Holling's, in
effect harnesses management in service of the scientific
17. See id. at 11-16 (describing core procedures and techniques of adaptive
environmental assessment and management).
18. See id. at 133 ("Prediction and traditional 'environmental impact
assessments' suppose that there is a 'before and after,' whereas environmental
management is an ongoing process.... Environmental assessment should be
an ongoing investigation into, not a one-time prediction of, impacts.").
19.

WALTERS, supra note 1, at 8.

20. Id. at 41-43.
21. Id. at 334-36.
22. Walters, supra note 1,

5.
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research enterprise. Thus, both Holling and Walters envision
adaptive management as a process driven more by the research
needs of science than by management imperatives per se. The
new learning generated by this process would be expected to
inform subsequent rounds of management decisions.
Walters also usefully distinguishes what he calls "active"
adaptive management from "passive" adaptive management,
and both of these in turn from mere "trial and error."23 "Active"
adaptive management, in Walters's view, consists of conscious
generation and testing of specific scientific hypotheses through
narrowly tailored, scientifically designed management
experiments. 24 "Passive" adaptive management, in contrast,
involves heightened monitoring of key indicators and
adjustment of policies in response to what may be learned
through such careful observation, while foregoing the conscious
experimental hypothesis-testing of the "active" model. 25 Even
"passive" adaptive management is, in Walters's view, several
notches in sophistication above old fashioned "trial and error,"
a crude and familiar process in which the manager simply tries
an approach thought most likely to succeed, and if it fails,
moves on to the next most likely successful alternative. 26
Kai Lee, a social scientist who served as a member of the
Northwest Power Planning Council in the 1980s, was perhaps
the first to introduce a variant of the Holling-Walters notion of
adaptive management into large scale natural resources
management in the United States. Lee employed it to inform
adjustments to hydroelectric dam operations in the Pacific
Northwest in a largely unsuccessful bid to reconcile power
production goals with salmon habitat protection needs. He
later became an important popularizer of the adaptive
management concept through his widely cited book, Compass
and Gyroscope.27 Like Holling and Walters, Lee conceives of
adaptive management as a modality of scientific inquiry, but
23. WALTERS, supra note 1, at 64, 232.
24. See id. at 232 (defining "actively adaptive policies" as those that
"include
deliberate
probing
for
information"
through
conscious

experimentation).
25. See id. at 232, 248-52 (characterizing "passively adaptive policies" as
those that are reassessed and adjusted regularly in response to new data and

information, but do not include "deliberate probing" through hypothesistesting experimental policies).
26. See id. at 64 (characterizing "trial and error" as a process of "blind
probing" without rigorous model-building and hypothesis-testing).
27.

LEE, supra note 1, at 8.
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Walters in particular
there are also crucial differences.
emphasizes the central importance of integrative ecological
modeling; for Walters, integrative ecosystem models are the
source of the hypotheses to be tested through adaptive
management techniques. In a sense, the whole point of the
adaptive management exercise is to fill in "knowledge gaps" in
the underlying ecosystem models. 28 Lee, however, appears to
de-emphasize the integrative model-building and modelrevising aspects of Walters's approach, with the result that his
conception appears somewhat more mechanistic and narrowgauge. In Lee's view, adaptive management proceeds directly
to advance competing hypotheses in an area of scientific
uncertainty, and then devises replicable policy experiments to
test these various hypotheses, treating pre-experiment
conditions as the control. 29 Such experimentation, he urges,
will reduce uncertainty with respect to the specific question
under examination, and thus inform subsequent rounds of
decision making. Lee's conception thus appears both less
integrative and more optimistic about the prospect of
generating definitive "right answers" to specific questions than
either Holling's or Walters's approaches, which are predicated
upon deep skepticism as to the possibility of generating
definitive answers, but are confident that science can
nonetheless provide continuously improved understanding by
30
peeling back layer after layer of uncertainty.
2. Macro-Adaptation: Evolving Institutional Configurations
Holling, Walters, and Lee have in common an
understanding of "adaptive management" as a carefully
28. See Walters, supra note 1, 2 (stating that such "knowledge gaps"
often "involve biophysical processes and relationships that have defied
traditional methods of scientific investigation" and that large-scale adaptive
management experiments provide the "quickest, most effective way to fill the
gaps").

29. Lee, supra note 1 ("Experimentation has three components: a clear
hypothesis, a way of controlling factors that are (thought to be) extraneous to
the hypothesis, and opportunities to replicate the experiment to check its
reliability.").
30. Compare LEE, supra note 1, at 56-58 (describing adaptive
management as a means of generating "reliable knowledge" and
"unambiguous results" through rigorous controlled and replicable
experiments) with HOLLING, supra note 15, at 133, 135 (emphasizing the
inevitability of uncertainty and the need to design environmental
management institutions that are responsive to change and "resilient enough
to absorb the unexpected and learn from it").
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tailored, rigorously structured variant on the familiar scientific
method of experimental hypothesis-testing-one that employs
policy measures as the experiment to field-test scientific
hypotheses. The goal is to improve scientific understanding in
the first instance; management improvements will follow, if at
all, only indirectly, through advancement of the science upon
which policy is based. Others, however, use the term more
broadly (and in the view of Walters and Lee, perhaps somewhat
promiscuously). 3 1 Yet from a manager's perspective, there may
be good reason to broaden the adaptive management concept
beyond scientific hypothesis-testing.
Two Minnesotans, Kristen Blann and Stephen Light, are
among the most articulate expositors of a broader conception of
adaptive management. In their view, adaptive management is
not simply about improving the science upon which ecosystem
management is based. Instead, "the heart of adaptive
management is the recognition of the need for more
fundamental transformation in response to the failures of
conventional scientific management," because "the most
significant barriers [to effective ecosystem management lie]
within the institutional architecture of resource management
bureaucracies and institutions themselves." 32 In short, what
we do not know about how to manage complex ecosystems
extends well beyond scientific gaps or shortfalls in technical
knowledge. It includes fundamental questions of institutional
design: How can we successfully organize ourselves to
undertake the complex task of managing ecosystems? What is
required is a "thorough, integrated, and interdisciplinary
assessment not just of the resource, but of the architecture of
33
conventional resource management decision making itself,"
proceeding (not surprisingly) in the familiar adaptive and
experimental fashion, treating any given set of institutional
arrangements as itself an experiment to be tested and
improved continuously over time, even as the technical and
scientific side of adaptive management proceeds apace. As a
corollary, Blann and Light are quick to challenge claims to
exclusive competence made by resource managers and
scientists, who are inevitably subject to "competency traps and

31. See Walters, supra note 1, 1 2 (criticizing "peculiar and myopic
definitions of adaptive management").
32. Blann & Light, supra note 1, at 2.
33. Id. at 3.
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[the] inertia of dominant paradigms." 34 They therefore call for
broader systematic input by various "stakeholder" groups, who
in their view are often able to inject important policy-relevant
perspectives and new information into the dialogue, to
challenge conventional assumptions and approaches, and to
generate an expanded range of policy options and richer
35
conceptual models of what is at stake.
3. "Adaptive Management" at the Hands of Federal Agencies
Whether conceived as a narrowly scientific method or an
expansive approach to the human and institutional, as well as
the scientific and technical aspects, of ecosystem management,
the adaptive management concept has captured the attention
of high-level policy makers. It has become almost a de rigueur
catchphrase in discussions of natural resources management.
Yet an examination of what federal agencies actually mean
when they use the term suggests a much narrower conception
than any of those outlined.
a. Habitat ConservationPlans
The FWS purports to employ adaptive management in the
design of a number of high-profile HCPs under the ESA. What
this form of "adaptive management" appears to reduce to in
practice, however, is inclusion of a pre-specified set of
contingency measures within the plan that would be triggered
if the initial effort fails to produce expected results. 36 Such an
34.

See id. at 2.

35. See id. at 9-12. This broad view of adaptive management thus roughly
approximates Jody Freeman's notion of "collaborative governanance." See
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 22 (stating that "collaborative governance" features "a problemsolving orientation," "broad participation,"
"provisional solutions,"
accountability through interdependence and mutual monitoring, and "a
flexible, engaged agency").
36. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK 3-25

(1996) (stating that adaptive management plans in HCPs should contain
clearly specified thresholds triggering review, and "a clear understanding and
agreement" as to the "range of adjustments which might be required"); Marj
Nelson, The Changing Face of HCPs, ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL., July/Aug.

2000, at 4, 5-6 (stating that "adaptive management" in HCPs consists of predefined contingency plans coupled with monitoring programs that trigger
alternative management policies at pre-specified thresholds); Gregory A.
Thomas, IncorporatingAdaptive Management and the PrecautionaryPrinciple
into HCPDesign, 18 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, Mar./Apr. 2001, at 32, 33

(stating that "another word for adaptive management" as practiced in HCPs
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approach involves neither the rigorous testing of scientific
hypotheses envisioned by Holling, Walters, and Lee, nor the
attention to institutional innovation and adaptation
recommended by Blann and Light.
At best, borrowing
Walters's classification, it may represent a highly constrained
form of "passive" adaptive management, or perhaps nothing
more than a structured variant on "trial-and-error" learning ("if
Plan A doesn't work, we'll try Plan B"). 37 Yet because the
contingency measures must be specified in advance to be
included in the plan, this approach appears to lack the openendedness of even the most familiar forms of trial-and-error
learning. While perhaps an improvement over conventional
rule-based approaches that simply assume away uncertainty
and proceed on the expectation that ex ante predictions will
turn out to be accurate, the FWS's version of "adaptive
management" is a very modest one that compares unfavorably
to the more rigorous and robust conceptions outlined in Part
I.A.1.
b.

United States Forest Service

The U.S. Forest Service has enthusiastically embraced the
concept of adaptive management, nowhere more so than in its
Northwest Forest Plan, the Clinton-era effort to develop
collaborative ecosystem management in the Pacific Northwest.
The Northwest Forest Plan's goal was to reconcile continued
timber production with protection of endangered species like
the northern spotted owl and various salmon species. 38 In the
U.S. Forest
Service's conception, however,
adaptive
management is not a recipe for general reorientation of natural
"is 'contingency planning').
37. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
38. See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ET AL., RECORD OF DECISION FOR
AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREST SERVICE AND BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
PLANNING DOCUMENTS WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL
2-4 (Apr. 13, 1994) [hereinafter ROD] (setting forth objectives of the
Northwest Forest Plan to achieve "land allocations and standards and
guidelines" that are both "ecologically sound" and "provide for a steady supply
of timber sales and nontimber resources"); Rebecca W. Watson, Ecosystem
Management in the Northwest: "Is Everybody Happy?", 14 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVT. 173, 174 (2002) (detailing the Northwest Forest Plan's impetus, content,
and level of success); Andrew N. Gray, Adaptive Ecosystem Management in the
Pacific Northwest: A Case Study From Coastal Oregon, 4 CONSERVATION

ECOLOGY

6

(Nov. 23,

2000),

at http://www.consecol.org/vol4/iss2/art6/

index.html (describing the Northwest Forest Plan as a plan to protect older

forests and the animals that depend on them).
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resource management policies. Instead, it is a specialized
research task to be carried out within specially designated and
territorially circumscribed "Adaptive Management Areas,"
where innovative approaches to forestry management might be
developed and field-tested. 39 On this conception, adaptive
management might be thought to bear a striking resemblance
to a familiar and time-honored "trial-and-error" method, the
"pilot project"-useful perhaps, but arguably more of a change
40
in terminology than in direction.
c.

EvergladesRestoration

The Corps, the lead federal agency in the Comprehensive
Everglades Restoration Plan, has made the concept of adaptive
management a touchstone in its ambitious, multi-billion dollar
plan to re-do South Florida's plumbing in the interest of
ecosystem restoration. 4 1 Corps documents tend to discuss
adaptive management in a highly general way, however.
Although the Corps promises adaptive policy adjustments in
response to future scientific discoveries and monitoring data, it
has thus far said little about what will be studied and
39. See ROD, supra note 38, at 6 (stating that ten "Adaptive Management
Areas" representing about 6% of federal land within the northern spotted
owl's range will be used to "test new management approaches to integrate and
achieve ecological, economic, and other social and community objectives").
40. See Lee, supra note 1 (criticizing the Forest Service's adaptive
management areas approach as little more than a "trial and error" exercise in
confined test plots, reducing adaptive management to a "buzzword" that
"means less than it seems to promise"). This criticism is consistent with
Oliver Houck's broader characterization of ecosystem management as
practiced by the Forest Service as essentially just a new label attached to a
familiar, highly discretionary "multiple use" management approach. See
Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81
MINN. L. REV. 869, 974-75 (1997) ("Ecosystem management, as currently
promoted, is politics with a strong flavor of law-avoidance.").
41. See Michael Voss, The Central and Southern Florida Project
Comprehensive Review Study: Restoring the Everglades, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 751,
752-53 (2000) (stating that the Army Corps of Engineers adopted adaptive
management as a framework for the Everglades restoration effort); U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS & S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., CENTRAL AND
SOUTHERN FLORIDA PROJECT COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW STUDY, FINAL
INTEGRATED FEASIBILITY REPORT AND PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT STATEMENT 5-32 (stating that CERP will rely on adaptive' assessment
to
"revise, improve
and
fine tune
management
procedures"),
http://www.evergladesplan.org/docs/comp-plan-apr99/sect5.pdf (April 1999);
Adaptive Assessment Team of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration
Plan, Adaptive Assessment/Management SOP White Paper 1, at http://
www.evergladesplan.orgpm/recover/recoverdocs/aat/082901 aa-sop draft.pdf
(Aug. 29, 2001).
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monitored, or what policies might be adjusted. 42 Critics charge
that this approach affords the Corps an opportunity to put off
tough decisions until later, while retaining discretion in the
early planning stages of a massive public works project to move
in any number of different directions. 43 To a substantial
degree, evaluations of the merits of this approach boil down to
a question of trust. Those who think the Corps has reformed or
is capable of reform might think an adaptive approach
desirable and necessary, given the extraordinarily complex task
of re-engineering all of South Florida's hydrology in an effort to
mimic historical "natural" hydrological conditions that existed
prior to massive anthropogenic disturbance. Because those
conditions are now impossible to replicate perfectly, substantial
experimentation is arguably justified. Others, more skeptical,
see the same old Corps up to its same old tricks, planning yet
another massive public works project for which it seeks prior
authorization of funds and environmental clearances while
retaining vast discretionary authority to devise the plan as it
goes along, all under the guise of "adaptive management."

B.

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AS DEWEYAN PRAGMATISM

Although "adaptive management" as practiced by federal
agencies to date must be rated something of a disappointment,
the concept is not likely to go away anytime soon. Nor should
its implications be underestimated. Adaptive management
presents a fundamental challenge to familiar natural resource
management and environmental protection paradigms: It
displaces fragmentary fixed rules with integrative science and
management predicated on a continuous process of
experimentation and mutually informed readjustment of both
goals and means. This process appears to many lawyers as

42. See, e.g.,
CONSOLIDATED

SOUTH FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., 2003 EVERGLADES
REPORT 7B-11 (2003) (describing the responsibility of

interagency RECOVER team to develop an adaptive management plan in
support of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, but discussing all

tasks in the future tense and general terms, e.g., "RECOVER teams will
organize and interpret new information obtained from system-wide and local
monitoring and research programs" and "will use modeling to identify
potential
solutions
to
any
performance
problems"),
http://www.
sfwmd.gov/org/ema/everglades/consolidated-03/ecr2003/chapters/ch7b.pdf.

(last visited March 1, 2003).
43.

See, e.g., Voss, supra note 41, at 768-69 (describing concerns about the

range of discretion vested in the Corps of Engineers through the adaptive
management concept).
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44
distinctly un-law-like and therefore deeply threatening.
Yet while adaptive ecosystem management is still
something of a novelty-indeed, perhaps only an idea still
awaiting its first real test run-the underlying experimental
approach should be a familiar one to philosophical pragmatists.
John Dewey outlined the core elements of a similarly adaptive
and experimental approach to policy making in his seminal
early twentieth century works. In his Logic, for example,
Dewey argued that every social policy "is logically, and should
be actually, of the nature of an experiment" to be tested in
practice, subjecting its consequences to rigorous observation
and analysis with an eye toward revising the policy in light of
what is learned from that experience. 45 In a long overlooked
legal essay, Dewey extended that view to the law generally,
arguing that legal precepts should be subjected to "a more
experimental and flexible logic" in which "general legal rules
and principles are [treated as] working hypotheses needing to
be constantly tested by the way in which they work out in
46
application to concrete situations."
For Dewey, of course, the experimental method was closely
tied to a broader epistemology of fallibilism, which viewed
every conclusion of fact as necessarily and inescapably
provisional and subject to revision or rejection when tested
against subsequent experience. 47 This fallibilist epistemology,
and its corollary instrumentalist focus on a pragmatic "theory

44. See Timothy H. Profeta, Managing Without a Balance: Environmental
Regulation in Light of Ecological Advances, 7 DuKE ENVTL. L & POLY F. 71,
86 (1986) (stating that adaptive management is "counterintuitive for the

American legal system, which puts a premium on firm rules of law"); Stewart,
supra note 8, at 57 (questioning the "compatibility of such arrangements with
democratic values of transparency, accountability, and the rule of law"); A.
Dan Tarlock, Fred Bosselman as Participant-ObserverLawyer: The Case of
Habitat Conservation Planning, 16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 43, 52 (2001)
(stating that "[miany environmental NGOs recoil" at the discretion required

for collaboration and adaptive decision making because it threatens to displace
mandatory standards with deals and to push hard management decisions to
the future).
45. JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 508-09 (1938).
46. John Dewey, Logical Method and the Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 26-27
(1924); see also JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY 277 (1929) (urging

that all "standards, principles, [and] rules" be "recognized [as] hypotheses...
to be tested and confirmed-and altered-through consequences effected by

acting upon them").
47. See DEWEY, supra note 45, at 39-40 (endorsing Peirce's "fallibilism" as
"something more than a prudential maxim" but instead an inescapable feature

of the human condition).
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of inquiry" or "experimental logic" at the expense of
philosophy's traditional and, in Dewey's view, misguided quest
for immutable
certainty ("truth" as conventionally
understood),4 8 led to Dewey's famous exchange with Bertrand
Russell, widely viewed at the time as a victory for Russell, and
a historical turning point after which philosophical
pragmatism
49
began to lose favor in American academic circles.
Dewey's experimentalism was, in part, inspired by
Darwin's theory of evolution. 50 In Dewey's view, intelligent
inquiry reflects the human species's organic adaptive response
to our complex and changing environment. 5 1 In that sense, it is
continuous with the adaptive responses of other, non-human
organisms to their own environmental conditions. 52 In Dewey's
view, evolutionary adaptation proceeds not only at the generic
level of the species, but also at the level of individual organisms
and, in the case of social species, social groups or populations.
These groups or populations' survival over time would be
determined by their ability to respond efficiently to inherently
uncertain environmental conditions. 53 For humans, then,
48. See DEWEY, supra note 46, at 242-46 (criticizing philosophy's "quest
for certainty" in an inherently uncertain world); see also JOHN DEWEY, What
PragmatismMeans by Practical, in ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC 303, 305
(1916) (urging that we "regard pragmatism as primarily a method, and treat
the account of ideas and their truth and of reality somewhat incidentally so far
as the discussion of them serves to exemplify or enforce the method").
49.

See TOM BURKE, DEWEY'S NEW LOGIC: A REPLY TO RUSSELL 7-8

(1994) (stating that Dewey's exchange with Russell proved "devastating to
Dewey's chances for serious consideration by philosophers and logicians").
Russell objected, inter alia, on the metaphysical grounds that objects must
exist independently of human experience, something for which there was no
room in Dewey's theory. See id. at 54-55. Russell also objected on
epistemological grounds that raw sense data constitute an irreducible core of
immediately knowable fact, the foundation upon which a non-fallibilist
epistemology can be built. See id. at 54-55, 85-86. These propositions are
themselves highly contested, of course, and recently pragmatism has regained
a foothold among academic philosophers, with some recent scholarship
arguing that Russell misunderstood Dewey's positions. See, e.g., id. at 7
(arguing that Russell "simply failed to comprehend Dewey's views").
50. See JOHN DEWEY, The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy, in THE
INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS
IN
CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT 1, 2, 18-19 (Peter Smith, 1951) (arguing that
Darwin's theory undercuts the entire tradition of Western philosophy and its
search for transcendental truth and meaning, and urges a reorientation
toward the pragmatic).
51. DEWEY, supra note 45, at 25-26, 32-33.
52. See id. at 35-36, 43-44.
53. See id. at 42-46; Richard Field, John Dewey, The Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, at http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/d/dewey.htm
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language, culture, and reasoned inquiry itself should be
understood as complex adaptive responses to the problem of
54
survival common to all species.
For Dewey, reason was inevitably rooted in and bound by
practical experience; the error of conventional philosophy was
its attempt to isolate reason by dissevering it from its organic
instrumental role, and hypostatizing it as "Pure Reason,"
capable of directly apprehending abstract a priori "Truth." In
our experience-bound condition, uncertainty was ubiquitous5
and inescapable; and much else followed from that premise.
It foreclosed the possibility of transcendental truth, or
knowledge of anything outside human experience. Accordingly,
the best we could do is proceed incrementally and
experimentally, judging the value of our ideas not against some
abstract standard of perfect truth but by their practical
consequences-i.e., would they be confirmed by subsequent
experience in a way that these ideas could be put to use in
solving human problems?
Yet one need not embrace Dewey's philosophical
commitment to universal fallibilism or his rejection of the
possibility of transcendental truth to recognize the potential
value of his "experimental method of inquiry" as an
instrumental approach to solving problems under conditions of
complexity and uncertainty. Even if one rejects Dewey's
epistemology as a general matter and assumes that some
things are ultimately certain and knowable, one might
acknowledge some domain of deep, befuddling, and intractable
uncertainty. Within that domain of uncertainty, whatever its
scope, Dewey's experimental method seems a promising way to
proceed. Conservation ecologists tell us that the complex
dynamics of ecosystems clearly represent one such domain of
uncertainty. Perhaps not surprisingly their recommended
solution of "adaptive management" closely tracks the
experimental method of inquiry Dewey outlined early in the
last century.
As Professor Dan Farber helpfully reminds us, however,
uncertainty is not confined to the realm of ecosystem
management: It is pervasive throughout environmental
(2001).
54. See DEWEY, supra note 45, at 42-45 (arguing that the influence of
culture on behavioral manifestations, the development of language, and
personal traits set humans apart from other animals).
55. See supra note 48.
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policy. 56 For that reason, Farber, echoing Dewey, urges that we
regard all of environmental policy as a "learning experience"
and search out dynamic models of environmental decision
making. 57 While much remains to be done to sort out just what
"adaptive management" means in theory and in practice, it
appears to offer at least the rudimentary elements of an
approach that can be expanded beyond its present confines, and
provides the conceptual underpinnings for a new pragmatic
approach to environmental decision making.
C. ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT'S CRITICS
Whatever its theoretical virtues, however, the notion of
open-ended adaptive decision making sets alarm bells ringing
among seasoned environmental lawyers, NGOs, and academic
commentators. 58 It is tempting, perhaps, to dismiss their
concerns as an overreaction based on fear of the unfamiliar; a
knee-jerk response by those who have profited most from more
familiar rule-based and rule-bound regulatory approaches; or
tunnel vision rooted in professional self-interest and selfdefinition. 59 After all, in general lawyers articulate, interpret,
apply, and enforce rules. A less rule-based and rule-bound
approach to environmental policy might threaten to put
environmental lawyers out of work, or at least diminish our
influence.
56. See Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning
Experience, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791, 796-97 (1994) (noting that a "high

degree of uncertainty" still exists in understanding environmental risks); see
generally DANIEL A. FARBER,

ECO-PRAGMATISM

5 (1999)

(stating that

"environmental law often involves long-run risks only recently discovered by
science and still subject to great uncertainty").
57. See Farber, supra note 56, at 801-06 ("[W]e need to move agencies to a
more dynamic model in which regulation is viewed as an ongoing cycle of
experimentation and adaptation.").
58. See Doremus, supra note 3, at 62 (arguing that agencies will "seek out
any flexibility the statute allows, and exploit it to deflect controversy" by
"deferfring] controversial decisions .. .delegat[ing] those decisions to others,
optimistically interpret[ing] data, and assum[ing] that uncertain or as yet
unproven initiatives will rescue disappearing species"); Houck, supra note 40,
at 880-83 (stating that specific, mandatory legal rules are necessary because
"commodity users have overridden the good intentions and discretionary
language" of past natural resource management statutues).
59. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental "Rule of Law"
Litigation, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 237, 241-42, 259-62 (2000) (arguing that
environmental NGOs are often skeptical of agency discretion and have
successfully advanced environmental protection goals through rule-enforcing
litigation).
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Setting aside such ad hominem considerations, however,
these critics raise legitimate concerns. First is the familiar
problem of agency capture. Agency capture can also occur in
the context of centralized rule making, of course, but
environmental NGOs express heightened concerns when
decisions are to be made in devolved, "place-based" arenas
under highly flexible and discretionary standards like those
seemingly required for adaptive management. 60 The playing
field may not be level in local arenas; concentrated local
interests with an interest in the outcome will often be in a
stronger position to influence the decision-making process in
their favor. Guardians of the "public interest" acknowledge
that, owing to familiar free rider and coordination problems,
they are typically underfunded and understaffed and destined
to remain so-a problem whether decisions are made locally or
centrally. A crucial difference, they argue, is that they can
maximize their influence by concentrating scarce resources on
a limited number of high-profile, national-level battles.
Meanwhile their opponents, putatively "concentrated" economic
interests, may find their power diluted at a national level,
where they face free-rider and coordination problems of their
own as they attempt to disseminate information, aggregate
interests, and coordinate lobbying efforts across a far-flung
national economic and political stage. Thus the two sides may
be more or less evenly matched as they do battle on a limited
agenda of high-profile issues before national-level decision
makers. If decision making is devolved to more numerous and
localized fora, the argument goes, the limited resources of
environmental organizations will be quickly diluted, while
concentrated local economic interests may actually gain
61
strength through direct access to decision makers.
The argument appears plausible on its face, though much
turns on how well organized environmentalists are, or can
become, at the local level.
National environmental
organizations built on a highly centralized staff model-with
members relating to the organization primarily by sending
60. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Michael McCloskey,
The Skeptic: Collaboration Has Its Limits, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS 11l 6-20

(May 13, 1996) (expressing concern that industry can exercise a potentially
higher influence at the local, rather than national, level), at
http://www.hcn.org/servletshcn.Article?articleid=1839.
61. See McCloskey, supra note 60, T 14 (arguing that local environmental
activists are often poorly trained and ill-equipped to operate on the basis of
parity with entrenched local economic actors).
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checks and receiving informational mailings and solicitations
for additional donations-are likely to have little influence in
localized decision-making arenas. Those groups with strong
and active local chapters may view matters differently. Indeed,
there are some indications of a divergence of views among
environmental groups.
Local environmental groups often
support and actively participate in local collaborative processes,
which afford them greater opportunities for participation than
more remote top-down, rule-making approaches. 62 Among
national organizations, those that can field an effective local
presence and those that define their mission to include placebased resource protection are also more likely to favor, or at
least not to oppose, locally devolved decision making, provided
their members or local chapters are afforded adequate
opportunities to participate. 63 Indeed, the shift of power within
the environmental movement implied by the localization of
environmental decision making might be as threatening to
some highly centralized national organizations as any putative
64
loss of power for environmentalism as a whole.
62.
NEWS

See Ed Marston, Squishy-Soft Processes, HardResults, HIGH COUNTRY
12-16 (Aug. 28, 2000) (arguing that successes of local environmental

groups in collaborative decision-making processes reflect their maturation and
growing independence from the paternal protection of national environmental
organizations
upon
whom
they
were
long
dependent),
at
http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article-id=5981;
McCloskey, supra
note 60,
6, 7 (acknowledging that local activists often support local
collaborative processes and find them "empowering," while bitterly criticizing
national
environmental
organizations
for
"cold-shouldering"
such
opportunities).
63. See, e.g., THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, ANNUAL REPORT 2001, 2-3
(stating that "[t]he Conservancy protects specific places where plant and
animal species can live for generations to come" through a range of strategies,
including land acquisition, helping other landowners manage their lands, and
collaborating with public and private partners in scientifically-based regional
conservation strategies), http://nature.org/aboutus/annualreport2001/files/
arweb_2.pdf (last visited March 1, 2003). For a generally optimistic view of
trends toward a greater role for environmental NGOs in locally devolved
ecosystem governance, see Lee P. Breckenridge, Nonprofit Environmental
Organizations and the Restructuring of Institutions for Ecosystem
Management, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 692, 692 (1999) (noting that "nonprofit
organizations have become key figures in coordinating transactions to resolve
conflicts over exploitation and conservation of natural resources," but these
developments pose new concerns about the representativeness of NGO views
and the dangers of cooptation).
64. See Lisa Jones, Howdy, Neighbor!As a Last Resort, Westerners Start
Talking to Each Other, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (May 13, 1996) (noting
arguments that some national NGOs find local collaborative processes
threatening because they shift decision making away from Washington and
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More importantly, perhaps, even if environmental NGOs
do participate in local collaborative processes, critics warn
about the dangers of unprincipled deal making in the absence
of clear external standards. 65 The flexibility demanded by
adaptive management thus might be thought to stand at odds
with fundamental principles of accountability. In particular, it
is sometimes argued that in the absence of clear and objective
rules enforceable on judicial review, the agency and its
bargaining partners will effectively have license to strike
whatever deals they want, implicating fundamental rule of law
concerns. 66 On an immediately practical plane, this often
translates into the concern that citizen suits, the favored tool of
generations of environmental lawyers, will become more
difficult and perhaps impossible in the absence of clear
substantive rules, procedures, and legally enforceable
67
timetables.
Finally, it is sometimes suggested that flexible and
collaborative approaches like-. adaptive management are
premised on the naive assumption that regulated parties will
willingly cooperate in constructing new and potentially costly
regulatory requirements-in effect, to help prepare the noose
for their own hanging. But experience demonstrates, it is
argued, that environmental progress often comes at a high
price. 68 Strong medicine is therefore required, either in the
reduce the sharply polarized and adversarial climate upon which their
fundraising depends), at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?articleid=
1828; see also Jason Scott Johnston, The Law and Economics of
Environmental Contracts, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE
APPROACHES

TO REGULATORY

INNOVATION

IN THE UNITED

STATES AND

EUROPE 295-96 (Eric Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2002) [hereinafter
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS] (noting the divergence of interests between

national and local environmental groups and their differing attitudes toward
contractual solutions).
65. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Breckenridge, supra
note 63, at 705-06 (cautioning that the "nonprofit form of organization alone
provides no substantive guarantee that ecological goals will be pursued" and
that some "may work to entrench existing interests").
66. See supra note 4.
67. See Doremus, supra note 3, at 84 ("Citizen suits are most effective
when statutes impose clear obligations or limits. Adaptive management seems

at first blush ill suited to such clarity.").
68. Estimates of the aggregate cost of federal environmental regulation
range into the hundreds of billions of dollars annually. See, e.g., Jonathan
Adler, Free & Green:A New Approach to Environmental Protection, 24 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POLY 653, 657 (2001) (citing a cost of $206 billion in 1999).

Recent scholarship has questioned the empirical basis for these kinds of
estimates, however, because most rely on industry or agency studies that may
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form of tough mandatory rules or substantial economic carrotsand-sticks. Collaboration, on this view, occasions stonewalling,
strategic bargaining, dilatory tactics, and other forms of
unilaterally imposed transaction costs, tending inevitably
toward stalemate or least-common-denominator outcomes. 69 In
short, the critics charge that adaptive management and related
approaches leave regulated parties with inadequate incentives
to take the business of environmental progress seriously.
Evaluating all the empirical claims embedded in these
arguments is beyond the scope of this Article. Let us suppose
for the sake of argument, however, that the criticisms have
merit, or at least are sufficiently plausible to warrant concern.
We appear then to be hooked on the horns of a dilemma.
According to the conservation ecologists, further progress
toward effective ecosystem management is impossible without
some form of adaptive management-the uncertainties are
simply too great. 70 On the other hand, if the critics are right
that in the absence of tough mandatory rules we risk agency
capture, lack of accountability, and inadequate motivation on
the part of private parties, then we open the possibility of
backsliding with respect to environmental protection goals. 71
be biased upward or downward. See Thomas 0. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg,
Counting the Cost of Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1997, 2057 (2002) (concluding that "regulatee and agency-prepared
regulatory cost estimates should be taken with a large grain of salt" because
they are "rarely grounded in firm empirical analysis and are often heavily
dependent upon fanciful assumptions").
69. See Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for
Regulatory Policy?, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS, supra note 64, at 93, 113
(arguing that negotiated decision-making processes tend toward leastcommon-denominator solutions, are often exceedingly time-consuming and
resource-intensive, and may exacerbate underlying conflicts); David B. Spence
& Lekha Gopalakrishnan, Bargaining Theory and Regulatory Reform: The
PoliticalLogic of Inefficient Regulation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 599, 625-34 (2000)
(arguing that strategic bargaining is a major impediment to effective
regulatory negotiation); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental
Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 141-43 (1998) [hereinafter Steinzor, Dangerous Journey]
(arguing that lengthy and complex negotiations place "public interest
representativies" at a disadvantage); Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention
and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP.
10527, 10529-30 (1996) [hereinafter Steinzor, Project XL] (characterizing the
EPA's Project XL as a "free-for-all" of "unrelated exemptions" as "companies
feel free to submit lengthy 'wish lists,' which will not receive rigorous and
effective review").
70. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
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So we seem to be left with an unpalatable choice-do we avoid
the risk of backsliding while foreclosing the possibility of
progress, or instead lay the groundwork for possible progress
while assuming the risk of retreat?
Or can we have it both ways? I argue that a particular
kind of rule-the "regulatory penalty default"-can set some
outer bounds of accountability without straightjacketing the
adaptive management process with excessive prescription. Not
only is this approach compatible with adaptive management,
but in some circumstances might be its prerequisite, the means
through which we can create the proper incentives for parties
to engage meaningfully in the adaptive decision-making
enterprise.
II. REGULATORY PENALTY DEFAULTS: INFORMATIONFORCING RULES
The emergence of adaptive ecosystem management is part
of a broader trend in environmental regulation, characterized
by a shift from highly interventionist, top-down, direct
regulatory prescription of mandatory rules of behavior-the
familiar "command-and-control" model-to incentive-based
approaches that seek to elicit desired, environmentally
beneficial outcomes through largely self-directed and selfmanaged initiatives. An important class of these incentivebased approaches relies on backstopping default rules that
regulated entities are free to "contract around" through implicit
or explicit bargaining with regulators and, in some cases,
regulatory beneficiaries. 72 A handful of early precursors of this
default-rule approach can be found in the regulatory programs
enacted in the 1970s, 73 even though mandatory rules
72. See David A. Dana, The New "Contractarian" Paradigm in
EnvironmentalRegulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 36 (noting the emergence
of a "contractarian" approach to environmental regulation in which regulated
entities individually contract to undertake measures not required by formal
law in exchange for relief from otherwise applicable rules); Shi-Ling Hsu, A
Game-Theoretic Approach to Regulatory Negotiation and a Framework for
Empirical Analysis, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 33, 33 (2002) (stating that
increased reliance on conciliatory negotiation oriented regulatory strategies
coincides with increase skepticism about the effectiveness of "top-down"
regulation); Johnston, supra note 64, at 286 (describing environmental
contracting against background status quo regulation as a "default rule
approach").
73. For example, the Clean Air Act encourages states to develop State
Implementation Plans to achieve federally mandated air quality standards
against a default rule authorizing EPA to impose a Federal Implementation
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predominated in that era. More recently, some rules initially
conceived as mandatory have been redefined as default rules,
in whole or in part. 74 Elsewhere, innovative regulatory
programs
have
consciously
incorporated
default-rule
approaches. Together, these categories seem to encompass the
lion's share of the most innovative regulatory reform and
reinvention initiatives that have emerged in recent years.
As indicated in Part I, among the most commonly voiced
criticisms of these devolutionary proposals are that regulated
parties will lack adequate incentives to undertake voluntary
self-regulatory measures, that they will exploit opportunities to
"game" the system through rent-seeking strategic bargaining,
and that negotiations will become mired in excessive
transaction costs.
The critics, however, often ignore the
important role played by default rules in creating incentives
for, and policing the boundaries of, bargaining and cooperation.
More particularly, one class of regulatory default rule, the
"regulatory penalty default," can create powerful incentives to
cooperate, while also forcing the production 75and disclosure of
information critical to the regulatory process.
Plan (FIP) if a state fails to act or produces an unsatisfactory plan. See 42
U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2000) (authorizing State Implementation Plans); id. §
7410(c) (authorizing EPA Administrator to issue FIP if a state fails to act or
submits a plan that does not meet federal criteria). Many environmental
permitting programs also incorporate a default rule approach. Wetlands
permitting under the Clean Water Act, for example, relies on a default rule
broadly prohibiting the discharge of dredged and fill material, but authorizes
site-specific permitting if the applicant can demonstrate that no "practicable
alternative" is available and all "appropriate and practicable" steps are taken
to minimize adverse environmental impacts. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000)
(prohibiting the "discharge of any pollutant by any person" unless authorized
by permit); id. 1344(a), (b) (authorizing issuance of permits for "discharge of
dredged or fill material" at "specified disposal sites" pursuant to regulatory
guidelines); 40 C.F.R. 230.10(a), (d) (2002) (establishing "no practicable
alternative" and "minimize adverse impacts" standards).
74. Recognizing the burdens placed on regulated entities by highly
prescriptive "command-and-control" regulation, as well as the difficulties
agencies face in crafting such complex rules, agencies themselves have sought
to reconfigure some conventional mandatory rules into default rules. Broadly
speaking, these post-hoc reinterpretations of mandatory rules as default rules
are a subset of what Farber calls "positive slippage" (or "affirmative slippage").
In practice, the differences that emerge between a nominal statutory mandate
and the actual practice of regulated entities when that divergence is created
by the regulatory agency itself in search of a better way of doing business.
Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297,
305-11 (1999) (defining "positive slippage"); id. at 315 & n.76 (noting in
passing that some cases of "positive slippage" involve penalty default rules).
75. The concept of a regulatory penalty default is not wholly new; others

2003]

ADAPTIVE ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT

967

A "regulatory penalty default" is a regulatory default rule
that imposes harsh consequences on regulated entities, and
thereby heightens incentives to "bargain around" the default
rule. The "penalty default" notion is adapted from contract
theory, where a penalty default is a gap-filling interpretive rule
that intentionally imposes a harsh outcome on one or more
parties in order to create an incentive for the parties to contract
around the default rule in favor of an explicit alternative
76
arrangement better tailored to their particular circumstances.
In the contract context, penalty default rules are said to be
especially appropriate in contexts of information asymmetry,
where one party might not have adequate incentive to reveal
germane, privately held information. 77 Penalty default rules
enhance efficient contracting by providing the incentive to
reveal this type of information. Because this otherwise silent
party desires to avoid the harsh consequences of the penalty
default, she will reveal her hand in contract bargaining,
leading to better-informed bargaining and explicit negotiation
over mutually advantageous contract terms. Contract penalty
have identified it, but left the idea largely undeveloped. See, e.g., IAN AYRES &
JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING
THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 108-09 (1992) (suggesting that a regulatory scheme

based on contracting around default rules could consist of either
"majoritarian" defaults or "penalty" defaults).
Similarly, in discussing
"affirmative slippage" from existing rules, Farber brushes up against the
penalty default concept but leaves it mostly unexplored. See Farber, supra
note 74, at 59, 315-16 & n.76 (1999) (noting the "interesting body of
scholarship" on information-forcing penalty defaults in contract theory, which
"might have some lessons for environmental law").
76. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, FillingGaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91-93 (1989) ("Penalty
defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to
contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the
contract provision they prefer .... [P]enalty defaults are purposefully set at
what the parties would not want-in order to encourage the parties to reveal
information to each other or to third parties ....

."

(emphasis added)).

The

classic example is Hadley v. Baxendale, in which a miller sued a carrier for
consequential damages consisting of lost profits resulting from delayed
shipment of a crankshaft necessary to run the mill. 156 Eng. Rep 145 (Ex. Ch.
1854). The court ruled that absent an explicit contract term, the shipper's
liability would be limited to reasonably foreseeable damages. Id. This rule,
Ayres and Gertner argue, creates a penalty default that penalizes the miller
for failing to reveal the unusually large damages he would incur, but allows
similarly situated parties to contract around the default rule.
77. See Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale,
51 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1554-56 (1999) (explaining that properly designed
penalty default rules can elicit asymmetrically held information by penalizing
the better informed party for failing to contract around the rule).
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default rules are thus said to have an "information-forcing"
78
character.
The regulatory analogy is concededly inexact. Contract
rules are mainly interpretive or gap-filling in character. 79 With
a few important exceptions, freedom of contract between
parties is the prevailing norm, but some interpretive and
interstitial rules are needed to resolve interpretive disputes
and to supply missing terms in incomplete contracts. Given the
fairly modest interstitial role played by legal rules in the
contract regime, most contract rules are appropriately
understood as default rules: Parties generally remain free to
contract around them simply by expressly agreeing to
80
alternative terms.
Environmental regulation is typically far more imperial in
its designs, however, going well beyond the interpretive and
gap-filling functions of contract rules.8 '
Contracts are
presumed to be voluntary and mutually beneficial
arrangements between parties; the function of the state in
contract law is to establish some basic background rules and
conditions conducive to this voluntary activity, and to serve as
a neutral umpire when disputes arise under the contract.
Moreover, contract negotiation typically need not be forced by
the legal regime; the operative assumption of contract law is

78. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 76, at 91-95; Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises:An Examination of the Basis of Contract,
89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1300 (1980) (stating that a rule limiting the award of
damages for unascertainable consequences of the breach induces the promisee
to disclose information that the promisor may not have and thereby
"increase[s] the efficiency of the promissory activity").
79. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 76, at 87; Randy Barnett, The Sound of
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 821-25
(1992) (discussing the gap-filling contract rules but criticizing this conception
as inadequately attentive to the role of consent in contract).
80.

See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.10, at 36 (3d ed. 1999) ("It

is important to understand.., that the great bulk of the general rules of
contract law, including those of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Vienna
Convention, are subject to contrary provision by the parties."). Not all
contract rules are default rules, however. See Barnett, supra note 79, at 82526 (discussing mandatory contract rules concerning fraud, duress, and
unconscionability).
81. See Adler, supra note 77, at 661 (stating that the conventional
paradigm of environmental regulation is predicated upon direct regulatory
control of any activity that has an environmental impact not factored into the
cost of products or services); Stewart, supra note 8, at 30-31 (characterizing
environmental regulation as "a form of economic central planning" that
requires detailed specifications of behavior of regulated activities).
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that contracting will occur on the volition of the parties, and
the function of contract law is simply to advance the goal of
efficient contract bargaining. Environmental regulation, in
contrast, starts from the premise that strong medicine will be
required to alter the behavior of otherwise reluctant regulated
entities. The goal, generally speaking, is to force regulated
parties to internalize sometimes quite large environmental
costs that they have been accustomed to externalize. Thus,
environmental regulation seems to call for a more coercive and
interventionist posture on the part of the state.
Most
environmental rules tackle this challenge head-on: A
governmental
authority typically issues authoritative
commands prescribing the alternative behavior that must be
undertaken.
These prescriptions are often made in
considerable detail, on penalty of substantial coercive sanctions
for noncompliance. In general we may label these mandatory
rules.82
Some regulatory rules, however, operate not as mandatory
rules but as default rules.8 3 Under this approach, regulated
entities are granted the option to avoid compliance with an
otherwise mandatory rule by "voluntarily" undertaking some
self-initiated alternative course of action that under specified
conditions may be deemed a satisfactory substitute for the
otherwise prescribed behavior. Regulatory penalty default
rules are a specialized subset of this broader category of
regulatory default rules. A regulatory penalty default is a
default rule that, if it takes effect, imposes, or is intended to
impose, harsh terms on the regulated entity, thereby creating
an incentive for the regulated entity to come forward
"voluntarily" with acceptable alternatives-in effect, to
"contract out" of the otherwise applicable default requirements.
Like their contract cousins, regulatory penalty default
rules can be designed to have an information-forcing character.
Indeed, this is one of their principal virtues, one that ought to
be exploited more systematically as we look to reform and
reinvent our regulatory system.8 4
A crucial difference,
82. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:
Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 710-11 (1999)
(distinguishing non-waivable mandatory rules from default rules, and arguing
that arbitration sometimes converts mandatory law into default rules).
83. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
84. The "information problem" in environmental regulation-the problem
faced by regulators in assembling the information required to prescribe
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however, is that unlike contract penalty defaults, regulatory
penalty defaults are also negotiation-forcing: They so alter the
incentive structure that bargaining will occur in situations
where, absent the penalty default rule, negotiation would likely
not occur. 85 To that extent, the negotiation of "voluntary"
alternatives to the regulatory penalty default rule is not quite
as freely volitional as ordinary contract bargaining. In the
regulatory context, then, the penalty default rule has a more
ambitious aim. It seeks to influence whether bargaining occurs
in the first instance, as well as the information revealed during
the course of bargaining. Nonetheless, the overall thrust of a
regulatory penalty default approach is to place the onus of
producing information on the regulated entity.
III. AN ILLUSTRATION: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
AND THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN
One of the boldest efforts to reconfigure conventional
environmental regulation into a penalty default regime was the
Department of the Interior's aggressive expansion of HCPs
during Bruce Babbitt's tenure as Secretary of the Interior.
Babbitt took a previously obscure and rarely used permit
provision, section 10(a) of the ESA, 86 and transformed it into
the centerpiece of his endangered species and ecosystem
conservation policy.
Section 9 of the ESA famously prohibits the "take" of listed
species of fish and wildlife.8 7 By statute, "take" includes
effective and efficient rules-has become a recurring theme in my own recent
work, and elsewhere in the environmental law literature. See, e.g., Daniel C.
Esty, Next-Generation EnvironmentalLaw: A Response to Richard Stewart, 29
CAP. U. L. REV. 193 (2001); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Data-Driven
Environmentalism: The Environmental Sustainability Index, 31 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10603 (2001); Farber, supra note 56; Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2002); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking,Precursorto
a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001) [hereinafter Karkkainen,
Information as EnvironmentalRegulation]; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a
Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's Environmental
Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002); Eric W. Orts & Paul
Kleindorfer, Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks, 18 RISK
ANALYSIS 155 (1998).
85. I owe this insight to Bill Simon, who also introduced me to the penalty
default concept.
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000).
87. See id. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (making it unlawful to "take" any species of fish
or wildlife listed as endangered); 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.31(a), 17.71 (2001) (extending
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harm.8 8 By regulation, "harm" extends to adverse modification
of endangered species habitat if it disrupts essential
behaviors.8 9 The result can be a blanket prohibition on habitatmodifying activities, including, inter alia, such basic economic
land uses as agriculture, silviculture, and real estate
development on lands where endangered species occur,
including lands held by private parties. 90
The ESA was amended in 1982 to create a small escape
caught in the viselike grip of this broadly
hatch for landowners
"prohibitive policy." 9 1 The presence of several listed species of
butterflies had effectively barred developers from building a
potentially lucrative housing development on San Bruno
Mountain, an undeveloped area on the San Mateo peninsula
just south of San Francisco. 92 The developers countered with
an offer to scale back their proposed development, dedicate the
remaining undeveloped land as a publicly-owned butterfly
habitat reserve, and undertake significant affirmative habitat
enhancements, including removing invasive vegetation,
replanting native species, and implementing an active,
permanently funded habitat management program involving
periodic prescribed burns to mimic the natural fire disturbance
regime under which, native vegetation prospers. Although the
butterfly habitat would be slightly reduced in size (about 13%
prohibition on "take" to fish, wildlife, and plant species listed as threatened).
88.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (defining "take" to include "harass, harm,

pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct").
89. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (defining "harm" to include, "significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by

significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding,
feeding, or sheltering"); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for
a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704-08 (1997) (upholding 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 as a
reasonable agency interpretation of the statutory prohibition on "take").

90. This seemingly sweeping and intrusive regulation may be something
of a paper tiger, however, because the FWS's limited monitoring and
enforcement capabilities probably allow many violations to proceed
undetected.

See Dana, supra note 72, at 38-39

(stating that from an

environmentalist perspective, the ESA is "underinclusive and underenforced");
Hsu, supra note 72, at 58-59, 61 (stating that detection of ESA violations and
enforcement of legal requirements on private lands are "woefully inadequate").
PROHIBITIVE
POLICY:
STEVEN
L.
YAFFEE,
91. See
generally
IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1, 32-58 (1982)

(discussing the ESA as a "prohibitive policy," defined as an inflexible, extreme
boundary-setting government intervention that does not allow regulatees to
develop alternative means to reach the prescribed social policy end goals).
92. See Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 979 (9th
Cir. 1985).

972

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:943

smaller), this modest loss of acreage would be more than offset
by qualitative improvements in the land's ability to support
butterflies. 93 This combination of measures, the developers
argued, would better serve conservation goals than the "handsoff' approach demanded by straightforward application of the
section 9 "no-take" provision, which prohibited further
modification of already degraded habitat but required no
affirmative conservation or restoration measures. 94 The FWS
accepted the logic of the developer's proposal but insisted it had
no legal authority to strike such a deal. 95 Congress then added
section 10(a) to the statute, authorizing the FWS to issue
permits for "incidental take" of a listed species, provided the
result would not be to appreciably reduce the species's
prospects for survival and recovery in the wild, and if
accompanied by an approved and adequately funded HCP
designed, at a minimum, to mitigate and minimize adverse
96
impacts.
In enacting section 10(a), Congress plainly contemplated
cases like the San Bruno Mountain plan which involved "winwin" (Pareto-superior) opportunities for enhanced species
protection in exchange for minor variances from the otherwiseapplicable "no-take" rule. For many years subsequent to its
enactment, however, the section 10(a) "incidental take" permit
provision was rarely invoked. 97 In part this may have been due
to spotty section 9 enforcement by a historically understaffed,
underfunded, and politically weak agency, which left
landowners little inducement to seek formal section 10(a)
permits; de facto, then, "incidental take" and perhaps
something more was already occurring on a widespread basis
93. Id. at 980, 982.
94. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Conserving Habitats and Building
Habitats: The Emerging Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land Use
Development, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 20-21 (1991) (noting that a biological

study commissioned by proponents of the San Bruno HCP concluded that even
without development, butterfly habitat would continue to decline due to
encroaching brush and illegal offroad vehicular traffic).
95. See Graham M. Lyons, Habitat Conservation Plans: Restoring the
Promise of Construction, 23 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 83, 90 (1999)

(stating that the San Bruno HCP could not be implemented without a
congressional amendment to section 9 authorizing such agreements).
96. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000).
97. See Karin P. Sheldon, HabitatConservationPlanning:Addressing the
Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279, 299-

300 (1998) (stating that only 14 HCPs were approved in the first 10 years after
Congress amended the statute).
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without permits. 98 Even scrupulously law-abiding landowners
had to question whether the costs of producing an HCP could
be justified by its dubious benefits, especially given uncertainty
as to whether a permit would issue under the indefinite and
highly discretionary standards set out in the statute. 99
Enter Bruce Babbitt and the California gnatcatcher, a
small songbird dependent on the coastal sage scrub, a habitat
type unique to southern California that was vanishing rapidly
under the onslaught of urban sprawl. Listing the gnatcatcher
as threatened or endangered would introduce legal uncertainty
into development plans across a large swath of San Diego,
Orange, and Riverside Counties, potentially at huge cost to
local landowners, developers, and local governments.10 0 Hoping
to avoid listing, California had earlier enacted the Natural
Community Conservation Planning Act (NCCP)' ° ' to provide a
framework for voluntary, collaborative, public-private habitat
conservation planning on a regional scale.10 2 This voluntary
process carried inadequate incentives, however, and was

98. See MICHAEL J. BEAN ET AL., RECONCILING CONFLICTS UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING

EXPERIENCE 41 (1991) (suggesting that landowners had no incentive to seek
HCPs because they faced no credible threat of section 9 enforcement in cases
of incidental takings).
99. See Sheldon, supra note 97, at 301-10 (describing barriers to
successful HCP negotiations, including a lengthy and costly decision-making
process and uncertainties arising from lack of clarity and consistency in HCP
policy). Under section 10(a), incidental take permits are not available "as of
right," but instead are discretionary. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (stating that the
Secretary of Interior "may permit" incidental take "under such terms and

conditions as he shall prescribe," provided applicant meets all statutory
requirements and "such other measures that the Secretary may require as
being necessary or appropriate" (emphasis added)).
100. See Marc J. Ebbin, Is the Southern California Approach to
Conservation Succeeding?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 702 (1997) (noting that the

listing "might have led to a showdown over the fate of the last remnants of
undisturbed landscape"); George Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the
Clinton Administration,7 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POLy F. 39, 41-42 (1996) (stating
that the federal government instead allowed the problem to be resolved on a
more local level); Sheldon, supra note 97, at 335-36 (noting that California
responded to threatened listings for a number of species on some of the most

valuable land in the United States).
101.
102.

CAL. FISH & GAME CODES §§ 2800-2840 (1998).
See CRAIG W. THOMAS, BUREAUCRATIC LANDSCAPES: INTERAGENCY
COOPERATION AND THE PRESERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY (forthcoming 2003)
(manuscript at 210, on file with author); Sheldon, supra note 99, at 335-36

(noting that California Governor Pete Wilson instituted the NCCP to respond
to the impending listing).
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making little, if any, progress. 10 3 Babbitt decided to list the
gnatcatcher, cognizant that this would precipitate a crisis and
force reluctant parties to take the NCCP planning process
seriously. 10 4 In response, landowners and developers-led by
Orange County's largest landowner and developer, the Irvine
Company-joined
with
state
and
local
officials,
conservationists, and federal agents to hammer out ambitious
regional multiple species conservation plans in each of the
three principal counties, providing for thousands of acres of
coastal sage scrub habitat reserves and employing local land
use regulatory authority to restrict and channel development
on other environmentally sensitive lands. 10 5
Success in California spawned ambition on a national
scale, as HCPs became a showcase of Clinton-era regulatory
reinvention. 10 6 Some 360 HCPs covering 30 million acres had

103. See THOMAS, supra note 102 (manuscript at 217); John M. Gaffin, Can
We Conserve California'sFisheries Through Natural Community Conservation
Planning?, 27 ENVTL. L. 791, 793 (1997) (noting that the results of the
voluntary NCCP in the case of the gnatchater "were disappointing"); Sheldon,
supra note 99, at 335-36 (stating that environmental groups rejected the
voluntary NCCP process as inadequate and petitioned to list the gnatcatcher
as endangered).
104. See Ebbin, supra note 100, at 696 (stating that Secretary Babbit
decided to give the gnatcatcher legal protection under the ESA, but in a way
that accommodates the collaborative and ecosystem-oriented thrust of the
NCCP).
105. See THOMAS, supra note 102 (manuscript at 222); Ebbin, supra note
100, at 696-97 & n.7. The Southern California plans did not arise under the
section 10(a) "incidental take" provision, but under section 4(d), which
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate special rules for the
protection of species listed as "threatened." See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2000)
(authorizing the Secretary of Interior to "issue such regulations as he deems
necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of [threatened)
species").
In this case, because the section 4(d) rules allowed local
governments and developers to operate in derogation from the otherwiseapplicable section 9 "take" prohibition, the species-specific section 4(d) rules
negotiated operated as the functional equivalent of a section 10(a) permit and
HCP, while allowing for greater planning flexibility. See THOMAS, supra note
102 (manuscript at 220-21, 224); Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A
Lesson for Conservationfrom Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism
for Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45,
96-97 (2002) (explaining that the gnatcatcher section 4(d) rule extends section
9 protection to the gnatcatcher, but exempts land-use activities consistent
with a valid NCCP plan approved by FWS as consistent with section 10(b)
incidental take permit criteria).
106. See Frampton, supra note 100, at 41-42 (describing Clinton
administration efforts to expand use of HCPs following the southern
California experience).
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been negotiated by September 2001.107 In the process, section 9
was transformed from an inflexible, uniform, mandatory, and
strictly prohibitory rule into a penalty default rule around
which landowners and other affected parties would be invited
to contract for locally tailored solutions. This, in turn, would
require regulated parties to produce and reveal information
about land characteristics, biological conditions, and economic
development plans and prospects. As a consequence, regulated
parties might propose and win regulatory approval for locationspecific affirmative conservation measures at a level of detail
that would be difficult or impossible for regulatory authorities
to prescribe from afar. In principle, such plans might extend
across the full range of local variations in habitat types and
economic conditions.
Of course, the de facto penalty default rule in the HCP
context-the section 9 "no-take" provision-was not initially
designed to function either as a penalty or as a default rule.
Instead, it was intended as an ordinary mandatory rule. But
the rule turned out to have such harsh consequences for
affected landowners that it could easily be converted to a
penalty default by exploiting an obscure, congressionally
authorized variance provision already available in the statute.
IV. REGULARIZING REGULATION WHILE AVOIDING
THE STRAIGHTJACKET OF TOP-DOWN PRESCRIPTION
The story of HCPs is not an unqualified success, but it is a
protean example of the power of penalty defaults from which
the following important lessons can be drawn. First, a
properly structured penalty default rule can create powerful
incentives for regulated parties to step forward with ambitious
"voluntary" environmental initiatives. This is so because the
default position-the consequences of noncooperation-can be
set at a painfully high level by the strategic exercise of federal,
state, or local governmental authority. 1°8 Whatever one may

107. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS
AND THE INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMITTING PROCESS, at http://endangered.

fws.gov/hcp/HCPs-and-Incidental-%2OTake.pdf (Nov. 2001).
108. Government's spending power may provide an alternative, or
sometimes complementary, incentive-a financial "carrot" to go along with the
coercive "stick" of penalty default rules. Indeed, many of the most ambitious
HCPs couple private-party concessions with federal expenditures on habitat
acquisition and management. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and
Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 101-02 (1997).
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think of the particulars of the San Bruno Mountain and
southern California coastal sage scrub agreements, it appears
that landowners and local governments in those cases have
pledged a far more ambitious set of affirmative conservation
measures than could have been expected had the penalty
default of section 9 not been hanging over their heads.10 9
Second, contrary to the claims of some critics of the HCP
program, such negotiated departures from a default standard
need not involve an erosion from a stronger level of
environmental protection to a weaker one. As the San Bruno
Mountain case clearly indicates, the ESA section 9 "no-take"
standard does not mandate affirmative conservation measures
designed to confer positive benefits on protected species or
biological communities, such as native vegetation restoration,
invasive species removal, and prescribed burns to mimic the
natural fire disturbance regime.110 Such measures are often
critical to maintenance of native plant and animal
communities. Bargaining against a default rule can produce
these sorts of affirmative conservation measures, which in
many cases may be more beneficial to protected species than
strict application of the prohibitory "do-no-harm" section 9
rule."I'
When the private costs of such bargained-for
affirmative measures are less than the private losses that
would result from strict application of the section 9 default
rule, the landowner has a rational economic incentive to seek
regulatory approval to undertake the affirmative alternative.
109.

See THOMAS, supra note 102 (manuscript at 224-25) (stating that

California's voluntary NCCP habitat planning process "needed at least one
federally listed species to provide the fundamental incentive for landowners,
developers, and public agencies to sacrifice other land uses").

Indeed, some

critics of HCPs have complained that the "voluntary" or "cooperative" process
of negotiating binding land use plans consistent with habitat protection looks
from their vantage point suspiciously like extortion. See, e.g., Kay Bailey
Hutchison, New Habitat Plan Hides an Old Game, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Jan. 16, 1995, at All.
110. See NoSS ET AL., supra note 13, at 65 (stating that the "seemingly
rigorous statndards of the ESA are actually of little or no value in addressing
many of the principal threats to species" because the statute does not "compel
the reconnection of already fragmented landscapes, the protection of suitable
but unoccupied habitats, the control of invasive exotics or overabundant native
opportunists ... the augmentation of small populations, or any number of
other actions").
111. See id. at 65 (stating that regional habitat based conservation can be

negotiated to include affirmative conservation measures that may be more
beneficial than simply "[h]olding the line on any future impacts to a protected

species").
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If the expected conservation benefits from such affirmative
measures exceed the expected harm to the listed species
resulting from any permitted derogation from the "no-take"
rule, the government, acting on behalf of the species, has a
rational incentive to agree to the bargain. In short, bargainedfor conservation planning need not be a zero-sum game, or
simple "slippage" from a stronger conservation standard to a
weaker one.' 12 The FWS might reasonably calculate that San
Bruno Mountain butterflies would be better off with slightly
smaller acreage of higher quality restored habitat than with
slightly larger acreage of lower quality degraded habitat; and
plainly the private landowner also calculated that it was better
off under that arrangement. Neither the bargaining nor the
affirmative conservation measures could have been expected to
occur, however, without the penalty default rule to structure
the incentives in that direction.
Third, a penalty default approach is likely to prove
especially useful in a context like habitat conservation
planning, or more broadly, in ecosystem management, where
due to a high degree of local variability in environmental and
economic conditions, mutually beneficial outcomes are likely to
depend upon location-specific factors. When problems are
highly location-specific, conventional mandatory rules will
often be a poor "fit" in particular cases. In the San Bruno
Mountain example, it is almost inconceivable that a rule
prescribed in Washington could have identified the precise mix
of restoration measures that would provide the greatest
conservation benefits on that particular patch of habitat, much
less one that would simultaneously be economically feasible for
the landowner. Such a prescription would require highly
detailed knowledge of the habitat type, the actual condition of
the particular habitat patch, what invasive species were
present in what quantities, what restoration alternatives would
work best on this particular terrain, and so forth, as well as
what kinds of development would be both economically feasible
and compatible with a sound habitat enhancement plan. But if
local parties-landowners, developers, conservation groups,
and local governments-can be induced to bargain, they are
likely to enter the discussion with some or perhaps a good deal
of local information already in hand, and may be better

112. See id. at 64-66 (arguing the regional HCPs may be preferable from a
conservation perspective to the "seemingly rigorous" section 9 standard).
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situated than federal regulators to develop or acquire the rest.
A costly, uniform default rule that allows for locally-tailored,
bargained-for alternatives, then, can be advantageous from a
conservation
perspective
because it encourages
the
development of locally-flavored rules or approaches that better
3
"fit" locally varying conditions. "1
Fourth, as in the contract context, the penalty default
approach in the regulatory context is information forcing, and
is most advantageous in situations involving information
asymmetries. This perhaps restates the previous point, but
with a slightly different emphasis. The question here is, who
should bear the cost of producing information-the regulator or
the regulated? In conventional mandatory regulation, the
regulator bears the burden of producing the information
necessary to justify imposition of a regulatory standard. As has
been widely observed, this often leaves the potentially
regulated party with no incentive-indeed a disincentive-to
cooperate by revealing what it knows or by producing
additional information. 114 Under the penalty default approach,
however, the regulated party begins with an incentive to avoid
a harsh default rule, which it can accomplish only by
affirmatively stepping forward with information to justify some
alternative arrangement.'1 5 If the San Bruno Mountain
113. Cf. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 106 (1992) (detailing the benefits

of allowing regulated entities to negotiate standards tailored to their unique
circumstances).
114. See Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity:
Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1819-20

(1989) (stating that businesses can avoid or mitigate the costs of regulation by
limiting the amount or credibility of toxicity data, creating "strong incentives
to produce studies aimed at increasing uncertainty").
115. I have argued elsewhere that California's Proposition 65, which
requires business to issue "clear and reasonable" warnings to all persons they
expose to certain toxic substances, has a similar information-forcing penalty
default structure. In the case of environmental exposures, in particular, it is

often highly uncertain who must be warned and what constitutes adequate
warning, leaving the polluter potentially subject to civil liability or criminal
liability for failure to warn. The statute allows, however, a state regulatory
agency to promulgate "significant risk" thresholds, below which warnings are

not required. To escape liability, then, polluters have an incentive to produce
the information needed to allow the regulator to establish regulatory
thresholds. The effect has been extraordinary industry cooperation in the

production of toxicity and exposure data. This has allowed California to set
regulatory standards at a record pace. See Karkkainen, Information as
EnvironmentalRegulation, supra note 84, at 345-47; see also David Roe, Toxic
Chemical Control Policy: Three Unabsorbed Facts, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10232,
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developer remains mum, it will be prohibited from developing;
but if it produces and reveals an HCP tailored to local
conditions and acceptable to the FWS, it may relieve itself of
the harsh obligations of the penalty default rule. The burden of
producing information and the incentive to do so thus shift
from the regulator to the proponent of the locally tailored
alternative. If the regulated entity is the cheapest information
producer-that is, if it holds relevant information or is better
situated than the regulator to produce it-this is a desirable
allocation of responsibilities.
Fifth, properly structured, a penalty default approach can
establish a minimum standard of environmental performance,
and thus safeguard against unprincipled deal making and
ensure a measure of accountability in the regulatory system
without imposing highly prescriptive, mandatory controls on
behavior. Here I depart from the actual practice of section
10(a) HCPs and imagine a slightly different set of
arrangements. One of the greatest failings of the HCP program
as implemented to date has been its failure to insist that HCPs
provide a higher level of protection to listed species (or biotic
communities, or whole ecosystems) than would be provided by
strict application of section 9 alone. The legislative history of
section 10(a) appears to contemplate a higher standard.
Members of Congress emphasized the positive conservation
benefits of the San Bruno Mountain plan and similar
negotiated solutions, suggesting that they expected that
incidental take permits would issue only in cases like San
Bruno Mountain where listed species would be better off as a
result of the agreement than under the section 9 "no-take"
rule.1 1 6 The statutory language they adopted falls short of that
mark, however, requiring only a finding by the Secretary of the
Interior that the taking "will not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of survival and recovery of the species in the
wild"' 1 7-suggesting that HCPs can be approved so long as the
protected species is left only slightly worse off. Critics have
10235-37 (2002) (detailing how Proposition 65 creates incentives for industry
to cooperate in establishing regulatory standards).
116. See Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 982-83
(9th Cir. 1985) (quoting from legislative history of the enactment of section
10(a), which describes the San Bruno Mountain plan as the model and

benchmark against which the adequacy of future HCPs should be judged and
characterizes the plan as one whose "overall effect ... can be beneficial to a
species, even though some incidental taking may occur").

117.

ESA § 10(a)(2)(B)(iv), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (2000).
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argued that the FWS's interpretation of this standard goes
even further, effectively reading "recovery" out of section 10(a),
and thereby allowing the FWS to approve HCPs that leave
some species substantially worse off in the long run, so long as
18
there is no immediate threat to their short-term "survival."
We can imagine a different and stronger waiver requirement,
one more in tune with what the legislative history suggests
Congress thought it was approving: a standard that requires an
affirmative showing that the listed species (or the biotic
community, or the ecosystem) would actually be better off as a
result of the proposed alternative. 19 Such a requirement
would set a minimum threshold standard of environmental
performance, limit the agency's ability to approve "sweetheart"
deals with developers, and ensure accountability to
congressionally approved environmental goals and objectives.
But it would do so in a way that still allowed maximum
flexibility to achieve innovative, locally tailored, "win-win"
solutions, so long as the minimum standard of performance is
met. In short, the penalty default approach can incorporate the
desirable accountability benefits of rules, without the
straightjacketing effects of mandatory prescriptive rules.
Sixth, to maintain accountability over time and under
conditions of uncertainty, the penalty default approach might
require a subsequent regulatory intervention, to be triggered if
actual performance falls significantly short of bargained-for
levels. It is one thing to propose and win regulatory approval
for an alternative to the default rule on the promise and
expectation that a certain level of environmental performance
will be achieved. It is quite another to achieve the expected
level of performance, given the kinds of complexities and
uncertainties inherent in ecosystem management which were
discussed at the outset of this Article.
Thus to ensure

118. See Jon P. Tasso, Habitat Conservation Plans as Recovery Vehicles:
Jump-Starting the Endangered Species Act, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y

297, 303-04 (1998). According to Tasso, FWS currently interprets the term
"survival" in section 10(a) to mean a species's "short-term persistence" and

"recovery" to mean its "long-term persistence." Id. at 299. It then interprets
the statutory bar on a plan that "appreciably reduce[s] the likelihood of
survival and recovery" to reach only actions that threaten both short-term

("survival") and long-term persistence ("recovery"). Id. at 302 (emphasis
added) (quoting ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (a)(2)(B)(i)-(iv)). Consequently, an act
that poses no immediate threat of extinction is permissible even if it impairs
the species's prospects of recovery long-term. See id. at 302-05.
119. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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accountability and enforceable standards of performance over
time, provision should be made for undoing or revising the deal
if actual performance falls significantly below the bargained-for
level. This, in turn, requires ongoing monitoring of actual
performance, a periodic review process, and re-opener
provisions, adding potentially significant implementation costs.
Some deals may be difficult or impossible to undo. This might
occur when implementation of the bargained-for plan results in
permanent alterations to habitat or costly investments in
physical infrastructure, for example. In such cases, some other
penalty, such as monetary compensation or a requirement to
offset adverse impacts with comparable environmental benefits
elsewhere, should attach.
Finally, one might be tempted to ask, "What is gained by
thinking about measures like HCPs as 'regulatory penalty
defaults'? Isn't this just a fancy name for a very familiar and
well established kind of regulatory device, the variance from an
otherwise applicable mandatory rule?" In my view, something
is gained by thinking about the deeper incentive structure that
is created by the penalty default device. The contract literature
reveals the incentives created by penalty default rules in the
contract context, and a similar logic of incentives applies in the
regulatory context. Thinking in this way might allow us to
imagine heretofore unexamined opportunities to restructure
regulation so as to achieve the beneficial effects that I have
outlined. Indeed, close examination of some recent regulatory
reinvention proposals-including, inter alia, Project XL,120
Performance Track, 12 1 "challenge regulation," 122 the EPA's "self120. See EPA, PROJECT
RESULTS, EPA 00-K-00-001,

2000).

XL: ENCOURAGING

INNOVATION,

DELIVERING

http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/xlbooklet.pdf (Sept.

This publication describes Project XL as an effort to stimulate

experimentation with new environmental protection technologies and
strategies by offering waivers from existing regulatory requirements in return
for promises of "superior environmental protection." Id. at 1.
121.

See EPA, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM

GUIDE, EPA 240-F-01-002 (describing Performance Track as a program to
reward environmental self-regulation by granting waivers from certain recordkeeping requirement to facilities and firms that implement environmental
management systems and commit themselves to continuous improvements in
environmental performance), http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/programguide.pdf
(Oct. 2001).
122.

See, e.g., EPA, 33/50 PROGRAM: THE FINAL RECORD, EPA-745-R-99-

004 (describing the EPA's 33/50 program, which challenged polluting firms to
meet voluntary targets of 50% reductions in 17 priority toxic pollutants by
1995, against the veiled background threat of regulatory intervention),
http://www.epa.gov/opptinr/3350/ (Mar. 1999).
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policing" policy, 123 Ayres and Braithwaite's proposal for
"responsive regulation," 124 and Eric Ort's notion of "reflexive
environmental law"' 2 5-reveals that they embrace the incentive
architecture of the regulatory penalty default. Like the HCP
program, however, their embrace is oddly backhanded, taking
the present regulatory structure as the point of departure and
using its real or imagined inefficiencies to create incentives for
regulated entities to undertake voluntary or bargained-for selfimprovement alternatives. For that reason, these proposals
have been vulnerable to the charge that they are merely
"parasitic" on the existing system of command-and-control
regulation. 126 But the penalty default notion allows us to see
the underlying regulatory logic of these reinvention proposals,
as well as their limitations. Viewing these proposals as
examples of penalty default regulation, we can quickly see that
at a minimum, conventional command-style mandatory rules
have come to play a very different role. It is not that they are
effective in solving hard environmental problems. Rather, their
sheer cost and inefficiency drive parties to seek to bargain
around them. Reinvention strategies do not so much rest on
the achievements of conventional regulation, as they rely on its
failings.
Beyond these examples, however, the penalty default
notion also allows us to begin to imagine how we might
consciously construct new and perhaps better calibrated
penalty default rules, creating more precise incentives than the
crude ones generated out of a command-and-control system
that establishes such incentives only through backhanded
inadvertence. Perhaps some penalty default rules might be
made harsher, or more lenient; or crafted to apply more broadly
or more narrowly than those that have emerged out of current
123. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and
Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (2000) (stating the EPA's policy
to eliminate or reduce gravity-based civil penalties and forebear criminal
prosecution for self-discovered and self-corrected violations of regulatory
standards so as to encourage higher levels of voluntary compliance and selfauditing).
124. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 116, at 106-09 (proposing a model
of "enforced self-regulation" in which regulated entities would devise and selfenforce rules tailored to their unique circumstances, thus contracting around
generally less efficient "backstop" or "default" regulations).
125. Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227
(1995).
126. See, e.g., Eric Weltman & Matt Wilson, Government's Job, in BEYOND
BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 2, at 49, 50-5 1.
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regulatory requirements designed with a much different end in
view. The recent Clinton era of reinvention failed to dream
such ambitious dreams, and instead settled for awkward efforts
to adapt, by administrative reinterpretation, an established set
of inefficient rules into a clumsy set of crude penalty defaults.
V. SOME CAUTIONARY NOTES
A. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE RENT-SEEKING AGENCY

What distinguishes regulatory penalty defaults from
contract penalty defaults is that in the contract case the
government is a neutral third-party arbiter evenhandedly
setting default rules for private parties, while in the regulatory
case the government both prescribes the default rule and
typically is also a party to the bargained-for alternative. This
commingling of roles introduces potentially serious conflict-of27
interest problems. 1
In the contract context, the penalty default rule is set by a
neutral third party (either a common law judge or a legislature)
with no particular interest in the outcome of any particular
bargain, but only a generalized interest in promoting efficient
bargaining. 12 8
In the regulatory context, in contrast,
background penalty default rules are established and enforced
by a regulatory arm of the state that is not neutral in
subsequent bargaining against the background rule, but
instead is an interested party to the ultimate agreement. From
the perspective of regulated entities, the state's conflict of
interest creates the potential for unequal bargaining and
abuse, of a kind loosely akin to extortion. By setting extremely
onerous default terms and high triggering thresholds for
departure from the default rule-or perhaps simply by refusing
to accept reasonable bargained-for terms on a case-by-case
basis-a rent-seeking state might be able to exact extreme
concessions from regulated entities.129
Perhaps the most crucial element in this volatile mix is the
triggering threshold necessary to justify departure from the
127.
128.

See Johnston, supra note 72, at 286-91.
Id. at 287 ("[A] fair case can be made that the common law contract

default rules come pretty close to what is optimal for typical contracting

parties."). But cf.id. at 287-88 (noting that some specialized areas of contract
law are controlled by legislative and regulatory bodies that may be subject to

interest group pressures and control).
129. See Johnston, supra note 72, at 286-91.
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default rule. Part IV discussed the role that tough, judicially
enforceable minimum performance thresholds might play in
alleviating the concerns of regulatory beneficiaries about
regulatory giveaways. Similarly, we might want to import
some kind of judicially reviewable standard as a safeguard
against abusive or extortionate demands by the agency. An
obvious analogy can be drawn to the Supreme Court's recent
Fifth Amendment "takings" jurisprudence with respect to
regulatory "exactions."
Conventional exactions, arising
primarily in the real estate development context, appear to be
based on a well established form of penalty-default regulation:
The state or local land use. regulatory authority typically'
establishes a highly restrictive regulatory permitting
framework, and then bargains with the proposed developer to
contract out of the otherwise applicable background rules,
"exacting" concessions such as dedications of land for streets,
parks, schools, and various other public amenities. 30 Like
other forms of bargaining against background penalty default
rules, these nominally "voluntary" agreements can look
suspiciously like extortion from the point of view of the
regulated party.
The Supreme Court has developed two doctrinal
requirements to protect against this kind of abuse: the
"essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" tests. Under
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,13 1 concessions
exacted from the regulated entity must bear some "essential
nexus" to the purpose served by an otherwise legitimate
governmental regulation; in the absence of such a nexus, the
Court says, the exaction would amount to "an out-and-out plan
of extortion."' 32 In Dolan v. City of Tigard,133 the Court added
130. See JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW AND GROWTH
MANAGEMENT 6-126 to 6-131 (2d ed. 2001) (stating that as a condition for
granting discretionary land use approval, communities often impose
"exactions" consisting of dedications of land, construction of facilities and
improvements, impact fees, and other public benefits).
131. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
132. Id. at 837. In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission conditioned
a permit for construction of a beachfront home on the Nollans' agreement to

grant a permanent lateral easement across their land, allowing users of a
public beach on one side of their property to gain access to another public
beach on the other side of their property. Id. at 827-31. The Commission

argued that the exaction was a reasonable means to offset adverse effects of
the new construction on coastal values, including impairment of visual access
to the ocean from the adjacent roadway. Id. at 838-39. The Court deemed the
claimed nexus-"access"-to be little more than a "play on words," insofar as
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another dimension to its "anti-extortion" jurisprudence, holding
that in addition to the Nollan "essential nexus" requirement,
the concessions exacted from the regulated party must be
"roughly proportional" to the adverse impact of the permitted
activity.
The Nollan and Dolan doctrines serve as a check on the
most extreme forms of extortionate bargaining. Note, however,
that these rules have limited scope; they do not reach all
potentially extortionate bargaining against the backdrop of
penalty default provisions. As both the Nollan and Dolan
Courts indicate, these rules apply in circumstances where, if
the government simply took what it instead exacts, that action
would amount to a "taking" in the constitutional sense. In
Nollan, the Court noted that the agency exacted surrender of
the right to exclude, one of the "most essential sticks" in a
landowner's "bundle of rights," 134 a result that if accomplished
directly "we have no doubt.., would have been a taking." 135 In
Dolan, the exaction effected a transfer of possession of a
greenway, amounting to permanent physical occupation of the
Dolans' land, a per se category of taking if accomplished
directly rather than indirectly through the exaction. 36 In other
the public's "visual access" to the ocean had little to do with the exacted
"physical access" by permanent public easement over the Nollans' land. There
was simply not a sufficiently close connection, the Court said, between the
purpose of the rule restricting development and the concession exacted. Id. at
838.
133. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). In Dolan, the city exacted dedication of a portion
of the Dolans' property for construction of a public storm drain system and a
bicycle path along the creek running across the back of the Dolan parcel,
reasoning that development in the creek's floodplain would increase the risk of
flooding and add to traffic congestion; the dedications therefore bore the
required "essential nexus" to legitimate public purposes served by the
regulatory scheme. The Court agreed that the required nexus was present,
but held that the city must also demonstrate "rough proportionality" between
what is exacted and the impact of what is permitted, based on "some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development." Id. at 391.
The city did not meet this burden. Thus, as another safeguard against
government-engineered extortion through bargaining against the backdrop of
regulation, the Court in effect demands a rough equivalency between the
quantum of private property interest surrendered and the quantum of public
values harmed by the permitted activity. See id. at 388-96.

134. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
135. Id.
136. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377-82. In addition, the Dolan Court expressly ties
its exactions jurisprudence to the broader doctrine of "unconstitutional
conditions," which holds that the government generally cannot condition
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cases, however, the landowner or other regulated party may be
asked to surrender a lesser quantum of property rightslimitations on land use, for example, that except in the most
extreme cases are not likely to rise to the level of Fifth
Amendment "takings" if accomplished directly through
regulation. In such cases, Nollan and Dolan would not apply.
The question is, should they?
Like many environmentalists and environmental scholars,
I have been skeptical of the Nollan-Dolan "essential
nexus/rough proportionality" requirements in the Fifth
Amendment regulatory takings context, and would be loathe to
extend these requirements as a matter of constitutional
doctrine. 37 Nonetheless, precisely because these standards
grow out of the Court's concern about the potential for abuse in
the form of government-sponsored "extortion," they might
suggest a rough-cast model out of which serviceable statutory
standards might be fashioned to protect regulated parties
against lesser but nonetheless serious forms of abusive
bargaining.
Certainly a strong case can be made for some kind of
Nollan-inspired "essential nexus" requirement, which seeks
simply to ensure that bargained-for agreements are related to
the purposes behind the regulatory scheme. After all, why
should regulators be permitted to exact concessions wholly
unrelated to the purpose of the regulation? One concern is that
courts might construe such a nexus requirement too
stringently, using it to rule out bargained-for arrangements
that may be congruent with the broader purposes of the
regulatory scheme, but not coincident with a narrower
understanding of statutory purpose reached by the courts. This
criticism can be leveled against the Nollan decision itself,
granting of a benefit upon surrender of a constitutional right. Id. at 385. The

unconstitutional conditions analogy holds, of course, only if what is
surrendered amounts independently to a constitutional right, in this case, the
right not to have one's property "taken" in the Fifth Amendment sense without
payment of just compensation. Id. at 385.
137. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 91-92 (1997) (arguing that extension of the Nollan and Dolan tests to
certain environmental permitting contexts might result in an increase in
successful taking challenges, with unsettling implications for biodiversity
conservation); Richard J. Lazarus, Fairnessin EnvironmentalLaw, 27 ENVTL.
L. 705, 722-32 (1997) (characterizing the Nollan and Dolan decisions as part of
a broader "backlash" against environmental regulation, and urging that
environmental law be more attentive to issues of distributional fairness to
preempt further expansion of takings doctrine).
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where the Court held that provisioning physical public access
to ocean beaches by an exacted easement was unrelated to the
goal of preventing visual impairment that it deemed to be the
138
purpose behind the restriction on beachfront construction.
But the broader purpose behind California's coastal
management act is to protect coastal resources and all forms of
public access to them, physical as well as visual, 139 and
management of trade-offs among the regulatory scheme's
subsidiary goals of physical access, preservation of viewsheds,
and protection of the natural environment is widely understood
140
to be within the California Coastal Commission's mandate.
In response to this concern about the potential for strict judicial
construction, the legislature adopting the regulatory scheme
would be well advised to express both the purposes of the
scheme and the statutory nexus requirement broadly, for
example, by requiring that bargained-for alternatives be
"reasonably related" to any of the (broadly stated) purposes set
out in the statute.
The Dolan "rough proportionality" standard -is more
problematic.
First, ,like many other court-constructed
balancing tests, it invites judges to weigh incommensurablesin this case, to balance the harm caused by the permitted
activity, on the one hand, against the burden to the regulated
party on the other.
The verbal formulation "rough
proportionality" suggests some relatively finely calibrated,
common metric by which to weigh such things. Typically,
however, there is no common metric, introducing a heavy dose
of subjective preference into the calculation. 14 1 Nor, even were

138. 483 U.S. at 838.
139. See California Coastal Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30001.5(a), (c)
(West 2001) (declaring that among the "goals" of the Coastal Act are to
"[pirotect, maintain, and, where feasible, enhance and restore the overall
quality of the coastal zone environment and its natural and artificial
resources," and to "[m]aximize public access to and along the coast and
maximize public recreational opportunities in the coastal zone").
140. See id. § 30007.5 (acknowledging that "conflicts may occur between
one or more policies" of the California Coastal Act, and mandating that "such
conflicts be resolved in a manner which on balance is the most protective of

significant coastal resources").
141. Cf. Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial
Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 51-53 (1987)

(criticizing judicial balancing tests on grounds that they invite judges to
second-guess the policy judgments and political accommodations reached by

democratic bodies on the basis of their own subjective re-weighing of
interests).
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a common metric available, is there any particular reason to
think that generalist judges are better at making such
calculations than legislators or regulatory agencies. 142 The
Dolan Court further compounds the difficulty by shifting the
burden to the regulator to justify the balance in the first
instance, leaving judges ample leeway to second-guess the
agency's "proportionality" calculation, or simply to reject it as
43
unproven. 1
A preferable approach, in my view, is to employ some
looser and more deferential formulation that does not invite
such judicial overreaching: for example, that the burden on the
regulated party not be "grossly disproportional" to the public
benefits of the bargained-for agreement. In addition, the
burden of proving a violation of this standard should properly
lie with the plaintiff.
One might also question whether the Dolan proportionality
test, as formulated by the Court, asks the right questions.
Specifically, why should the degree of harm caused by the
permitted activity be the relevant consideration when
evaluating the positive benefits of the regulation? A broader
formulation, such as the importance of the public values served
by the overall regulatory scheme and the particular bargainedfor agreement, seems to better capture the benefits side of the
ledger. Note, however, that this broader formulation threatens
to make "rough proportionality" almost indistinguishable from
another regulatory "takings" test: the now-familiar Penn
Central balancing test, which weighs the nature and
importance of the public values served by the regulation
against the burden on the regulated party, taking into account
"distinct investment-backed expectations. " 144 That is a balance
that more often weighs in favor of the regulatory scheme, as
courts recognize that they are not well positioned to secondguess legislative judgments on such broad questions of public
value.
The suggestion here, then, is that a modified form of the

142. See id. at 52.
143. See Marshall S. Sprung, Taking Sides The Burden of Proof Switch in
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996) (stating that the
Dolan Court required that "governments come forward and justify their
regulatory land use decisions to the factfmder," disadvantaging governments
as litigating parties).
144. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28
(1978).
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"essential nexus/rough proportionality" requirement be
included in statutes establishing penalty-default regulation,
requiring that bargained-for alternatives to the default rule
must be "reasonably related" to the broadly stated purposes of
the regulatory scheme, and that the bargained-for burden on
regulated parties not be "grossly disproportional" to the public
values advanced by the regulatory scheme. Such legislated
standards, if judicially enforceable, would provide some
protection to regulated parties against clearly abusive
regulatory rent-seeking, even in cases where Nollan and Dolan
themselves did not apply. Such standards might also provide
some additional safeguard against unprincipled regulatory
giveaways. The "reasonably related" standard, in particular,
suggests that the concessions exacted must bear some
reasonable means-end relationship to the environmentally
protective purpose of the regulatory scheme, so that the deal
produces environmental benefits of roughly the kind the
statute was intended to promote. This would require, of course,
that regulatory beneficiaries be granted standing to enforce
these standards through judicial review via citizen suits, an
avenue not generally available to regulatory beneficiaries in
the Fifth Amendment takings context.
B. BARGAINING FAILURE

Regulatory penalty defaults must be constructed with an
eye toward the likelihood that bargaining will sometimes fail.
First, in some bargaining contexts transaction costs might
prove excessive from the perspective of either the regulated
party or the regulator, or both. Second, even setting aside
transaction costs, in some circumstances mutually beneficial,
Pareto-superior
solutions
might
not
be
available.
Notwithstanding this Article's earlier insistence that
bargaining against default rules need not be zero-sum, it is
highly improbable that positive-sum solutions would be
available in all circumstances.
Whether Pareto-superior
bargains are to be had will depend in part upon the nature of
the default rule-how onerous its terms are, what level of
environmental benefits it provides, and so forth. This leads to
the seemingly absurd result that Pareto-superior solutions are
most likely-and therefore successful bargaining is most likely
to occur-in the case of extremely onerous default rules
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providing modest regulatory benefits. 14 5 Of course, the goal
here is not simply to induce the largest number of successful
bargains, but rather to achieve the greatest regulatory benefit
at the lowest total cost 146-a goal likely to be better served by
somewhat more moderate default rules establishing a higher
threshold of regulatory benefits.
These considerations should operate as a practical
constraint on the regulator's calculation as to where to set the
default rule, and under what circumstances to approve
departures from it. Recognition that sometimes we will simply
have to live with the consequences of the default rule should
tend to operate as a moderating influence in determining where
to set the default rule. As a rough rule of thumb, default rules
should probably not be set at levels that would regularly exceed
technological and economic feasibility in the event of
bargaining failure. But this notion stands in some tension with
other goals of the penalty default-rule approach. After all, the
whole point of penalty defaults is to create incentives for
bargaining by imposing harsh default outcomes, a goal that
could be undermined if default rules are made too mild.
Setting appropriate penalty defaults thus becomes something
of a balancing act.
Another factor in determining where to set the penalty
default is the need to maintain a credible threat of
enforcement. Extremely stringent default rules threatening
severe economic and political disruption might not be viewed as
credible by regulated parties, who might question the
regulator's will actually enforce the rule, or perhaps count on
political or legal recourse and on that basis decline to bargain.
congressional
trigger
might
consequences
Too-harsh
intervention, for example-a factor clearly at play in the ESA,
where Secretary Babbitt felt compelled to tread gingerly
against the background threat of repeal or drastic amendment
of the statute. 147 In other cases, enforcement of penalty
defaults might rise to the level of Fifth Amendment "takings,"

145.

See Johnston, supra note 64, at 286 (noting that "the greater the

efficiency under a particular regulatory regime, the greater will be the gains to
be realized from bargaining around that regime").
146. A lower total cost takes into account administrative and transaction
costs, as well as private costs to regulated parties.
147. See Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A
ReportorialFragmentof ContemporaryHistory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2375, 2380-81
(2000).
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as we saw in Part IV.A. Regulated parties might count on
these legal or political consequences, or simply calculate that
against these background threats the agency is unlikely
actually to enforce the default rule. These factors would also
push in the direction of moderating the severity of penalty
defaults.
By the same token, however, the credibility of the threat
depends in part upon the regulatory agency's enforcement
capacity and zeal. As we saw in the Endangered Species case,
bargained-for outcomes were scarce in the early days of HCPs
in part because the threat of section 9 enforcement by an
underfunded, understaffed, and politically weak FWS was
perceived to be minimal. 148 Thus, even while promoting HCPs
as a workable alternative to repealing the ESA, the Babbitt-era
Department of the Interior also ramped up ESA enforcement as
an indispensable precondition for successful negotiation of
49
HCPs.1
Apart from the stringency of the default rule and the
credibility of the deterrent, regulators also must decide where
to set the triggering threshold under which departures from the
default rule would be permitted. I argued above that the
triggering threshold should be one that promises
environmental performance at least as great, or greater, than
that expected from the default rule itself. 150 Relative levels of
environmental performance may not be easy to define and
quantify, 15' however, especially in circumstances involving
bargaining over complex, multidimensional environmental
148.
149.

See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
See Sax, supra note 147, at 2381 (stating that the administration had

a dual strategy to demonstrate that the ESA was both "workable (did not have
to be

revised)

and working

(was being effectively

enforced

and was

accomplishing species protection)").
150.

See supra Part IV.

151. One of the major problems with the EPA's Clinton-era Project XL
program was its failure to define clearly what would count as "superior
environmental performance," the triggering threshold to justify departure
from otherwise applicable regulatory rules. As a result, negotiations often
broke down in endless wrangling over whether various sets of expected

outcomes should or should not count as "superior environmental performance."
See Thomas E. Caballero, Project XL: Making It Legal, Making It Work, 17
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 399, 406-08 (1998) (detailing ambiguities and
disagreements concerning how to define and measure "superior environmental

performance"); Stewart, supra note 8, at 67 (stating that Project XL has
achieved "disappointing" results due in part to "uncertainties and
inconsistencies in the establishment of default baselines, evaluation of
proposals' environmental benefits, and the criteria for project approval").
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outcomes such as habitat quality and ecosystem health. Here
again, a deep tension is exposed.
Crisp, bright-line
performance thresholds are likely to reduce transaction costs
and promote successful bargaining, but potentially at the cost
of stifled creativity and missed opportunities for less obvious or
harder-to-measure environmental gains. Defining sufficiently
rich but objective metrics of performance, then, will be a task of
central importance, and one that is unlikely to be settled once
and for all time.
C. TOWARD DYNAMIC PERFORMANCE BASELINES?

All this suggests that the performance thresholds
necessary to trigger relief from the default rule must be set
with great care, because where they are set will play a very
large role in determining whether bargaining is successful and
what kinds and levels of environmental gains follow. But that
brings us full circle to the considerations that began this
Article.
Given pervasive complexity and uncertainty in
ecosystem management and in environmental policy generally,
we are likely never to know ex ante and with certainty which
default rules and performance thresholds will generate optimal
environmental outcomes. So when all is said and done, we
seem to have fallen back into the same information trap that
we sought to escape.
Yet all is not lost. Under such conditions of pervasive
uncertainty, Dewey's experimental method of inquiry-or
adaptive management, if you will-once again recommends
itself.152 The solution, then, is to set default rules and
performance thresholds at the levels justified by our best
current knowledge, but to treat default rules and performance
standards and metrics themselves, like other elements of the
environmental policy puzzle, as provisional and experimental,
to be revised in light of subsequent learning. Building the
capacity to learn and to revise default rules and performance
thresholds in light of actual experience would require careful
monitoring, analysis, comparison, and critique of both
bargaining outcomes and
the actual environmental
consequences of various bargained-for arrangements, in
characteristically Deweyan fashion.
This approach has additional implications.
First, it
suggests that bargained-for solutions should be of limited
152.

See supra Part I.B.
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duration, to allow for subsequent adjustment in light of new
learning and revision against the backdrop of revised rules and
performance thresholds. Limiting the duration of bargained-for
arrangements under a shifting regulatory background also
introduces, however, an element of regulatory uncertainty that
might threaten to undercut bargaining. From the point of view
of many regulated parties, much of the value of a bargained-for
regulatory alternative is precisely that it operates as a certain
shield against future regulatory threats. For this reason, the
Department of the Interior includes a controversial "no
surprises" guarantee in HCPs, promising that if subsequent
learning indicates the need for additional habitat- or speciesprotective measures, the burden of producing them will not fall
153
on the landowner.
Here, then, another deep tension is exposed: Pervasive
uncertainty argues in favor of a dynamic regulatory baseline
and more frequent renegotiation of agreements, while from the
point of view of some regulated parties bargaining may best be
effectuated by offering the assurance of fixed deals of certain
terms and longer duration. Once again, there is no obvious
way to resolve this tension, other than to suggest that these
competing considerations must be balanced in the design of the
default-rule regime, and rules and expectations adjusted in
light of subsequent experience.
The demand for the certainty of fixed terms should not be
overstated, however. Some parties may be more flexible than
to require deals of fixed duration and certain terms. The
contract literature has observed the emergence, primarily in
business settings, of the so-called "relational contract" under
conditions of complexity, high uncertainty, and unpredictable
change. 154 In a relational contract, parties enter into a
contractual relationship to work together for mutual benefit,
often under highly indefinite performance standards such as
"best efforts." 155 These relationships are common in the
business world, for example, in supply-chain management.' 56 A
153. See Joseph L. Sax, The Ecosystem Approach: New Departuresfor Land
and Water, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883, 884-85 (1997).
154. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090-91 (1981) (stating that
relational contracts emerge "[w]here the future contingencies are peculiarly
intricate or uncertain" so that "parties are incapable of reducing important
terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations").
155. See id. at 1111-12.
156. Martin Christopher, Relationships and Alliances: Embracing the Idea
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manufacturer in a highly competitive and technologically
innovative industry might anticipate the need to manage rapid
change in both its product line and production processes while
maintaining or improving product quality, and therefore might
not be able to specify in advance the precise quantities, prices,
or technical specifications of the parts and supplies it will need.
The need for stable cooperative relationships with reliable
supply partners that are able to adjust their own production
schedule and product lines on short notice thus becomes
imperative. Flexible relational contracts that leave the details
157
to be filled in later are essential in such settings.
The obvious environmental
analog is ecosystem
management, which we described at the outset as requiring
ongoing collaboration among multiple parties engaging in joint
adaptive problem-solving under conditions of complexity and
high uncertainty. Such arrangements are typically far more
open-ended and "relational" in character than the simple model
of two-party, fixed-term bargaining examined thus far. They
are nonetheless purposive, in much the same way that
industrial supply chain management is highly purposive.
As noted earlier, skeptics question whether parties will
have adequate incentives voluntarily to undertake and
maintain such collaborative "relational" arrangements, and to
keep them on track toward real environmental performance
gains. To be sure, some regional ecosystem management
efforts, such as the Chesapeake Bay Program, have persisted
over many years and appear to involve genuine efforts to
achieve environmental objectives, but critics suggest that these
are the exception, not the norm. 158 But once again, regulatory
penalty defaults might offer a solution. The threat of harsh
consequences if collaborative ecosystem management fails
might trigger cooperation, motivate participants to undertake

of Network Competition, in STRATEGIC SUPPLY CHAIN ALIGNMENTS 272, 27273, 277-84 (John L. Gattorna ed., 1998) (describing the emergence of highly

integrated,

intensive,

long-term

customer-supplier

strategic

alliances,

partially displacing traditional arms-length "transactional" relationships).
157. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
SURVIVING SUPPLY CHAIN
INTEGRATION: STRATEGIES FOR SMALL MANUFACTURERS 60-62 (2000) (stating
that successful supply chain contracts "serve as frameworks for relationships,"
are "unavoidably incomplete," and include information-sharing and adaptive
mechanisms rather than specifying detailed fixed rules).
158. See Cannon, supra note 9, at 407-16 (contrasting the Chesapeake Bay
Program's success to the experience of other collaborative watershed

management initiatives, and discussing explanatory hypotheses).

2003]

ADAPTIVE ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT

995

substantial commitments, and impose discipline on the process
over the long term.
An example of such a collaboration-and-adaptationreinforcing penalty default is the EPA's proposed total
maximum daily load (TMDL) rule under the Clean Water Act
(CWA). Section 303(d) of the CWA requires states to identify
waters that fail to meet established water quality standards, 159
60
and to establish TMDLs for pollutants entering those waters. 1
If states fail to perform these duties, the obligation shifts to the
EPA to prepare and implement TMDLs. 16 1 This requirement
was long ignored until a rash of lawsuits in the 1990s forced
the Clinton-era EPA to reexamine its TMDL policy.
Abandoning its failing defensive litigation posture in favor of
an aggressive policy offensive, the Clinton administration
proposed a new rule that reinterpreted the section 303(d)
TMDL requirement to require states to establish enforceable
controls on nonpoint as well as point source pollution. 162 The
rule-later suspended in response to congressional opposition,
and still not in force' 63-would also require states to establish
159. Under the Clean Water Act, states establish water-quality
standards-consisting of a designated "use" and "criteria" determining
pollutant levels appropriate to the designated use-for each water body
segment within their borders. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a), (c)(2)(A) (2000). In theory,
these water-quality standards are then reflected in National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, which establish permissible
effluent limitations for point sources of pollution as a complement to
nationally uniform technology-based effluent limitations.
In practice,
however, the water quality side of the NPDES permit system is badly
underdeveloped. States sometimes fail to establish (or -to update) water
quality standards. In other cases they adopt weak or vague. standards, or fail
to make the complex calculations necessary to translate broad area-wide
media quality objectives into source-specific permit limitations. Perhaps most
importantly, NPDES permits do not reach non-point sources of pollution.
160. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A), (C).
161. See id. § 1313(d)(2).
162. See Revisions to the Water Quality and Management Regulation, 40
C.F.R pts. 9, 122-124, 130 (2001) (previously published at 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586
(July 13, 2000)) (final EPA rule revising requirements for states to establish
and enforce Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) of pollution from point and
nonpoint sources for waterways with impaired water quality); see also Oliver
A. Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program V: Aftershock and Prelude, 32
ENVTL. L. REP. 10385 (2002) (describing TMDL rule making); Lisa E. Roberts,
Is the Gun Loaded This Time? EPA's Proposed Revisions to the Total
Maximum Daily Load Program, 6 ENVTL. LAw. 635, 648-56 (2000) (detailing
history of TMDL litigation and the EPA's response, culminating in proposed
new TMDL rule).
163. See Effective Date of Revisions to the Water Quality and Management
Regulation, 40 C.F.R pts. 9, 122-124, 130 (2002) (previously published at 66
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water quality monitoring and modeling programs and to make
subsequent adjustments to their TMDL requirements if the
initial measures failed to improve water quality to acceptable
levels.
The states complain that developing and implementing
TMDLs requires extensive data, high-quality technical and
scientific information, and sophisticated modeling capabilities
that they may not have the financial or technical capacity to
generate. 64 Indeed some have argued that the diversion of
scarce agency resources to meet the demands of the TMDL
process could undermine other and potentially more costeffective water quality and aquatic ecosystem management
efforts. But the onerous and straightjacketing character of the
formal TMDL process has also triggered aggressive, proactive
efforts on the part of some states to improve water quality in
segments currently on their impaired waters lists, so as to
preempt the need to produce TMDLs in the first instance. The
Chesapeake Bay Program, for example, indicates that it plans
to undergo a self-designed, collaborative, and experimental
"parallel TMDL" process to assign pollutant loads basin-wide
and on a tributary-specific basis to bring dissolved oxygen to a
level that would allow each state to remove Bay waters and
tributaries from its impaired waters list by 2010, a year before
a formal TMDL would be required. By obviating the need for a
formal TMDL, Chesapeake Bay Program participants believe
they will protect flexibility for experimentation and voluntary
approaches. 65 Imposition of an external penalty default, then,
appears to supply the motivation needed to induce program
participants to redouble their "relational" efforts to achieve real
environmental performance gains in the Chesapeake Bay
66
region. 1
Fed. Reg. 53,044 (Oct. 18, 2001)) (establishing April 30, 2003, as the effective
date for the new TMDL rule).
164.

See Houck, supra note 162, at 10389-96.

165. See Karl Blankenship, Bay Program Must Clean Chesapeake by
2010-Or Else, BAY J., http://www.bayjournal.com/99-09/TMDLS.HTM
(describing Chesapeake Bay Program cleanup as an effort to "beat the TMDL
clock" to avoid inflexible and costly regulatory requirements) (Sept. 1999).
166. See CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, CHESAPEAKE BAY 2000, at 5 (stating
joint commitment by Chesapeake Bay Program partners to undertake
cooperative efforts to ensure that by 2010 they will improve water quality in
the Bay and its tributaries so that these waters may be removed from the
impaired waters list prior to the time when regulatory mechanisms under
section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act would be applied), http://www.
chesapeakebay.net/pubs/chesapeake2000agreement.pdf (June 28, 2000).
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Like other examples discussed in this Article, the section
303(d) process and the EPA's proposed TMDL rule operate as
penalty defaults accidentally rather than by design, and may
not be ideally suited to that purpose. But the example suggests
the constructive role that penalty defaults could play in
encouraging
collaborative
and
adaptive
ecosystem
management, and disciplining it to drive toward objective
performance improvements.
CONCLUSION
Drawing its inspiration from John Dewey's "experimental
method of inquiry" and contemporary theories of adaptive
ecosystem management, this Article has proposed a two-tiered
adaptive approach to environmental problem-solving, centering
on the use of penalty default rules to encourage flexible
bargained-for arrangements. Under this approach, Congress
and the regulatory agency would set credible, moderately
stringent penalty default rules, with the expectation that most
parties would elect to "bargain around" the harsh implications
of the default rule by devising locally tailored solutions
expected to meet or exceed environmental performance
standards established by default rule.
This approach has some crucial advantages over
conventional mandatory regulation. Rather than attempting to
calibrate mandatory rules precisely to achieve optimal
environmental outcomes-an impossibly ambitious task given
the uncertainties and complexities involved-the regulator
need only fashion a somewhat more imprecise and rough-hewn
penalty default rule, around which bargaining would occur.
Bargained-for solutions would be tailored to local conditions,
which vary widely in the ecological management context. The
penalty-default approach is "information-forcing," shifting the
burden and the incentive to produce and disclose information to
regulated parties who are often better-situated than central
regulators to produce policy-relevant information. Yet properly
structured, the penalty default approach retains the crucial
advantages of accountability typically associated with
mandatory rules.
By thus wedding flexibility with
accountability, the penalty default approach holds the potential
to address important criticisms leveled against adaptive
ecosystem management and "democratic experimentalist"
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solutions more generally. 167
Learning and adaptation enter this picture in two ways.
First, as the central repository of information generated by a
series of locally bargained-for outcomes, the regulator gains
knowledge and experience over time, putting it in a position to
identify and diffuse successful institutional innovations,
scientific knowledge, management techniques, and other
lessons learned from prior agreements into subsequent rounds
of bargaining. Although every local situation is likely to be
unique in some crucial respects, nonetheless there might be
significant opportunity for rolling improvements in bargainedfor solutions over time as generalizable lessons are learned
through experience, and this information is incorporated into
the design of later agreements. Second, as suggested in Part
IV.C, systematic monitoring and analysis of the actual
performance of bargained-for solutions sets the stage for
revision and refinement of both default rules and performance
expectations over time.

167. The term "democratic experimentalism" wag coined by my colleagues
Mike Dorf and Chuck Sabel to describe a family of innovative regulatory
strategies that seek to combine local deliberative experimentation with central
coordination and rolling improvements in performance standards. See Michael
C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of DemocraticExperimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 283-89 (1998). A standard criticism of this body of work
is that it fails to explain satisfactorily how local deliberation and
experimentation can be reconciled with rules of accountability without
strangling the former or eviscerating the latter. See, e.g., Burkard Eberlein &
Dieter Kerwer, Theorising the New Modes of European Union Governance,
European Integration Online Papers, at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002005a.htm (stating that a major theoretical question facing democratic
experimentalism is "[h]ow can the shadow of hierarchy be reconciled with the
autonomy necessary for deliberation?") (last visited March 1, 2003).

